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Abstract 
 
Ashton M. Verdery: Demography and Social Network Differentiation 
(Under the Direction of Barbara Entwisle) 
 
 Nearly all societies in the world have completed or begun a demographic 
transition, but their experiences have varied in terms of timing, tempo and extent of 
mortality and fertility decline. I focus on understanding what implications such variation 
has for social interaction. Though prior literature has explored demographic contributions 
to opportunities for interaction between individuals of different ages, it has focused on 
social ties between very close kin (such as children and parents), particularly in the 
context of multi-generational co-residence. This paper extends this focus by considering 
broader kinship links in communities, which are important components of community 
integration. To do this, I use a simulation approach that combines the traditions of 
demographic micro-simulation and social network generation with techniques of agent-
based modeling. Results are presented concerning how variations in demographic history 
manifest as differences in modern social networks. These are validated against a set of 
specific cases from Thailand.
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Demography and Social Network Differentiation 
Introduction 
Evidence of declining social integration in America (McPherson et al. 2006; 
Marsden 1987), and other parts of the developed (Yee 2000) and developing world (de 
Souza and Grundy 2007) has been of great interest to sociologists. Much of this interest 
stems from theories suggesting that low social integration has negative implications for 
individuals’ political participation (Putnam 2000), health (e.g., de Souza and Grundy 
2007; Berkman et al. 2000; Seeman 1996; Moen et al. 1989), economic success 
(Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Woolcock 1998), and other sociologically interesting 
outcomes. The literature has focused on documenting the decline (e.g., McPherson et al. 
2006) or discussing its implications (e.g., Putnam 2000), and scores of empirical studies 
have validated these concerns. Significantly less effort has been put towards explaining 
these trends.  
Why is social integration declining? Contemporary and classical theorists have 
linked it to the decline in voluntary association (Putnam 2000), others to increasing 
economic modernization (Durkheim 1893[1933]), and still others to the general processes 
associated with urbanization (Simmel 1903[1971]). This paper explores the 
responsiveness of one component of social integration, social network structures 
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generated by kinship relations, to historical changes surrounding the demographic 
transition, a pattern of social change that has been observed in nearly every country in the 
world. Doing so, this paper extends the large literature linking demographic change to 
family structure differentiation (Smith and Oeppen 1993; Dykstra and Knipscheer 1995; 
Ruggles 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2007; Ruggles and Goeken 1992; Zhao 2001; 
Post et al. 1997; Ruggles and Heggeness 2008; Kobrin 1976; Soldo 1981), but moves the 
focus from intra-household relationships to broader social networks linking members of 
communities. Given the importance of kinship networks in the literature and the 
suggested relation of social networks to demography in both classical and contemporary 
theory (Durkheim 1893[1933]; Simmel 1903[1971]: 324-339; Blau 1974: 616; 
Granovetter 1973: 1379; Entwisle 2007), the dearth of prior work on this topic seems 
strange. This paper fills that gap by addressing how the timing, tempo and extent of 
mortality and fertility decline influence social network form and differentiation, with 
specific reference to kin networks. 
Societies vary with respect to their experience with mortality and fertility decline. 
The first section of this paper compares the historical trajectories of demographic 
transitions throughout the world, focusing on countries’ and regions’ differentiation in 
terms of the timing of onset, pace of decline, and difference between pre- and post-
transition fertility and mortality levels. These differences may generate diversity in social 
network forms, especially those surrounding kinship, but little is known about how much 
variability in contemporary social network structures is due to these historical factors.  To 
investigate the connection between historical patterns of mortality and fertility decline 
and contemporary kinship networks, I use simulation as an approach, combining the older 
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traditions of demographic micro-simulation and models of social network interaction 
with newer techniques of agent-based modeling. Such an approach has not previously 
been used in analyses of the demographic transition or in analyses of social network 
differentiation; here, I employ the control afforded by this method to manipulate 
parameters reflecting the timing, tempo and extent of fertility and mortality decline in 
order to parse the independent contributions of such important sociological features. An 
important component of this work is that it starts from a set of specific cases which I will 
attempt to replicate through empirical validation using an unusual set of data from Nang 
Rong district, Thailand which has frequently been used to study important demographic 
and sociological phenomena (e.g., Entwisle et al. 1996; Van Wey 2004; Faust et al., 
1999; Entwisle et al., 1984). 
 
Demographic Transitions 
 Almost every society in the world has completed or begun some sort of 
demographic transition (Guest and Almgren 2003). The demographic transition is “the 
process of modernization of the reproductive behavior in human populations” (Chesnais 
1990: 327). Separating the social phenomenon of the demographic transition from 
demographic transition theory is challenging, and, indeed, few descriptions of the former 
are not augmented with arguments concerning the latter (Casterline 2003). Nonetheless, 
despite the often contentious debates about demographic transition theory (cf. Mason 
1997; Coale 1973), the demographic transition itself can be divided descriptively into 
pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional stages (Guest and Almgren 2003).  
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Generally, societies progress from stage 1, where birth and death rates are both 
high and in equilibrium with little population growth, to stage 2, where death rates, 
especially those in the first years of life, are lower than fertility rates, allowing significant 
room for population growth. From there, societies progress to stage 3, where mortality 
and fertility rates are again near equilibrium but both low, resulting again in low 
population growth. Movement through these stages is generally thought of and 
collectively referred to as the demographic transition. The numerous debates surrounding 
this pattern are not the focus of this paper; instead, I focus on variation between societies 
in terms of their experiences regarding the timing, tempo and extent of mortality and 
fertility decline.  
Societies throughout the world have exhibited substantial variation in their 
experiences with mortality and fertility declines. The majority of research focus has been 
on fertility transitions (cf. Dyson and Murphy 1985; Mason 1997; Bongaarts and Watkins 
1996; Caldwell and Caldwell 2006), though some efforts have been made to understand 
mortality transitions (e.g., Caldwell 2006; Preston 1980; Preston 1985a). Table 1 
summarizes the general timing and tempo of fertility transitions for 13 world regions 
(Caldwell and Caldwell 2006)
1
. For large regions of the world, the table shows the year 
in which the median country from that region’s fertility had declined 10% from its pre-
transition levels, a change that is taken to indicate a significant shift in fertility patterns, 
                                                 
1 The regions in the table are argued to be “demographically consistent” by Caldwell and 
Caldwell (2006), meaning that countries in those regions had generally similar 
experiences with the demographic transition in terms of timing of onset and tempo of 
fertility and mortality decline. This singular focus on fertility is unfortunate, but a 
comparison of dates of onset and tempo of change national mortality transitions is 
lacking in the literature. Caldwell and Caldwell (2006: 227) explain that this is because 
“too many nineteenth and early twentieth-century European mortality statistics were 
unreliable or nonexistent.”   
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and the mean number of years that countries in that region took to decline from 10% to 
40%. 
As shown in table 1, there is great variation in the timing and tempo of fertility 
transitions. The fertility transition did not happen simultaneously throughout the world. 
Indeed, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East began their fertility 
transition almost 100 years after Europe and the most developed, English-speaking 
colonial states. As shown in the more complete table A1 in the appendix, some countries 
(Guadeloupe, Guyana, Singapore Hong Kong, China and North Korea) took as little as 5 
years to proceed from a 10% decline to a 40% decline, while a considerable number of 
others took 30 or more years (Belgium, England and Wales, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Scotland, Italy, Iceland, France, Ireland and the United States).  
It is well known in the demographic literature that fertility is the product of a 
specific set of interactions and events, termed  proximate determinants, which can be 
approximated by the average female age at first marriage, the extent of contraceptive use 
and induced abortion, and the duration of post-partum sterility in the population 
(Bongaarts 1978; Bongaarts 1983). When looking at changes in fertility patterns over 
time, researchers typically explore changes in the age pattern of fertility (which is linked 
to the changes in the age at first marriage) and changes in contraceptive use (Coale and 
Trussel 1974; Coale and Trussel 1978). Tsui (1985), among others (e.g., Nortman 1977), 
looked at changes in contraceptive use. She found stunning changes in contraceptive use 
over short periods of time (see Tsui 1985: 118). For instance, contraceptive prevalence in 
the population rose from 15% in 1969 to 33% in 1975 in Thailand; in Mexico it rose from 
30% to 40% in just one year between 1977 and 1978. In the developing world, there was 
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considerable heterogeneity in the prevalence of contraceptive adoption by the time of the 
World Fertility Surveys (WFS) – 34% of Latin Americans surveyed had adopted 
contraceptive use, compared to 21% of Asians and 20% of Middle Easterners but only 
5% of Africans (see Tsui 1985: 122). Leridon and Ferry (1985), among others (e.g., 
Rindfuss and Morgan 1983), focused on the role of non-contraceptive (and non-abortive) 
restraints on fertility noting the role of cultural norms in influencing the age of onset of 
sexual intercourse, periods of marital separation, length of interbirth intervals, and the 
end of exposure to the risk of pregnancy. Again, substantial variation throughout the 
world and substantial changes over the course of the 20
th
 century were some of the key 
findings from these analyses. 
Mortality transitions, like fertility transitions, have also varied, though less is 
known about their comparative timing and tempo (see note 1 above, Mason 1997; 
Hirschman 1994; Heueveline 2001). Infant and child mortality rates have received a 
significant focus, especially due to the comparative data made available by the WFS 
(Preston 1985b). As an example of diversity in the progression of the mortality transition, 
consider these examples from sub-Saharan Africa. The estimated probability of dying 
before the age of 5 decreased 0.111 in the 34 years between 1949 and 1983; in contrast, 
in Burkina Faso, there was a decline of 0.209 in the 33 years between 1948 and 1981. As 
with fertility declines, the developed world experienced mortality declines much sooner 
than those in the developing world, though mortality declines in the developing world 
have happened more quickly and at significantly lower levels of development (Preston 
1985a; Davis 1956; Caldwell 1986). 
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Not only have mortality declines in the developing world begun later than those in 
the developed world, there has also been a much smaller lag period between onsets of 
mortality and fertility decline. This lag period accounts for a large part of the variance in 
experience with the demographic transition throughout the world. Bongaarts and Watkins 
(1996) show that countries experienced their fertility transitions at vastly different levels 
of development and with large differences in infant mortality rates and life expectancy at 
birth. Indeed, the variation can be seen in this small list: Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Jamaica began their fertility transitions with infant mortality rates of 37, 41, and 43 per 
1,000 and life expectancies of 63, 65, and 67 respectively, while Turkey, Egypt and India 
began theirs with infant mortality rates of 176, 166, and 131 per 1,000 and life 
expectancies of 49, 50 and 50 respectively.  
Previous considerations of the impacts of the timing and tempo of the 
demographic transition can be grouped into two categories. The majority of work has 
considered the demographic transition’s implications for economic development (e.g., 
Zhang, Zhang and Lee 2001; Chesnais 1990; Coale and Hoover 1958), while some work 
has focused on the implications for social interactions between individuals of different 
ages (e.g., Ruggles 1986, 1988, 1994, 1996, 2007). The former work is outside the scope 
of this paper, given the complementary relationship between demographic change and 
economic development. The latter however, points the way to important theoretical 
contributions to be made by considering the demographic transition’s implications for 
social interactions. 
Unfortunately, despite the wealth of literature on the topic of demographic 
contributions to the opportunities for interaction between individuals of different ages, 
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the majority of the focus has been within the household (Smith and Oeppen 1993; 
Dykstra and Knipscheer 1995; Ruggles 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2007; Ruggles and 
Goeken 1992; Post et al. 1997; Ruggles and Heggeness 2008; Kobrin 1976; Soldo 1981). 
The primary consideration in this literature has been a debate about the relative 
contributions of demography and economic development to the phenomenon of declining 
intergenerational co-residence, and the evidence seems in favor of economic 
development (e.g., Ruggles 2007). However, these analyses have focused largely on 
whether historical demographic realities were a limiting influence on household co-
residence patterns, particularly multi-generational families. I extend this concept outside 
of the household, as kinship network links in communities have been shown important 
predictors of community integration (Entwisle et al. 2007). Understandings of the 
processes which create differences between places in terms of such extra-household 
networks are entirely lacking, and as a start, I consider the role of the demographic 
transition. 
 
Social Networks and Demography 
Kinship networks, defined more broadly than household co-residence, are 
important social structures (Schweizer and White 1998). They have been shown relevant 
to many aspects of life including employment and economic prospects (Grieco 1987; 
Zimmer and Aldrich 1987), demographic decision-making (Choldin 1973; Tilly and 
Brown 1967; Bras and Neven 2007; Entwisle et al. 1996; Sandberg 2005), health 
outcomes (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2008), worldviews (Vaisey and Lizardo 2008; 
Fowler and Christakis 2008), and revolutions in power and governance structures 
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(Padgett and Ansell 1993). The affective nature and relative permanence of family ties 
makes them a primary unit of social bonding, the so-called strong ties in the social 
network literature (Granovetter 1973). Beyond direct kin relations, indirect connections 
to kin (in social network terms, ties which are more likely to be "weak" (Granovetter 
1973) such as a cousin’s spouse) can be thought of as conduits through which resources, 
information and obligations might pass. Throughout the world, kin predominate 
information sharing circles, as has been shown in the United States (McPherson et al. 
2006; Marsden 1987), Kenya (Kohler et al. 2001), Mexico (Massey 1990), and Thailand 
(Entwisle et al. 1996). Kinship groups also act as a primary locus of resource sharing in 
the developed (Grundy 2006; Grundy and Henretta 2006) and developing world 
(Piotrowski 2006; VanWey 2004). Kinship networks are, in short, vital units of 
sociological analysis. 
The broad opportunities for kin interaction created by demography have important 
implications for the translation of local social processes into global structural forms. 
Indeed, a key insight of the demographic literature is that the availability of certain types 
of people – for instance, reproductive aged women – are critical determinants of 
sociologically important phenomena. Such an insight, the importance of accounting for 
the risk of an event occurring by accounting for the underlying population distribution, 
has greatly enhanced understandings of numerous demographic phenomena. This idea is 
not lacking in the social network literature, though it is not always explicitly 
acknowledged (Blau 1974; Robins et al. 2005). Classical analyses of social structure
2
 
paid great attention to the constraints that the spread of people across time, space and 
                                                 
2 Here I use the term social structure to mean the set of relations linking individuals or 
entities. 
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social grouping placed on associational patterns (Durkheim 1893[1933]; Simmel 
1903[1971]: 324-339; Marx 1939[1978]: 276-278; Weber 1923[1981]: 352-370, 
1904[1958]: 39-40).  
These early insights did not disappear. For instance, Blau (1974: 616) posited that 
structural parameters were the basis of observed social structures, indeed that social 
structure could be defined as “population distributions among social positions along 
various lines – positions that affect people’s role relations and social interactions.” 
Likewise, Granovetter (1973: 1379) thought that “demography, coalition structure and 
mobility are just a few of the variables which would be important in developing a micro-
macro linkage” in the explanation of social network differentiation. More recent research 
has acknowledged the ways that fertility and mortality change might affect social 
structure and patterns of interaction (Watkins, Mencken and Bongaarts 1987; McNicoll 
1986). Contemporary work has argued that social network differentiation might be 
attributable to historical migration patterns (Entwisle 2007; Entwisle et al. 2007). 
Prior demographic patterns affect social networks by constraining individuals' 
opportunities for interaction. This paper thus explores how the possibilities for interaction 
covary with patterns of fertility and mortality decline; it makes no comment on the 
possible changes in the meaning of different relationships or changes in the likelihood of 
activating the ties that are possible. The idea is well put in articles concerning homophily 
and racial segregation. In the literature on homophily – the tendency for individuals with 
similar attributes to be associated – careful distinctions are made between “baseline 
homophily” and “inbreeding homophily” (McPherson et al. 2001), with the former being 
a function of random expectations given relative group sizes (see also Blau 1977) and the 
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latter of proclivities towards preferential association above a randomly expected baseline
3
 
(Goodreau, Kitts and Morris 2009). The distribution of populations across space is 
another dimension of baseline homophily that is less frequently considered in the social 
networks literature, yet it has been shown crucially important for estimates of friendship 
segregation by race among adolescents (Mouw and Entwisle 2006). 
Demographic change alters the distribution of people across sociological 
categories, which will have important implications for relations between people in these 
different categories. Such age-distribution effects are well studied in the demographic 
literature, especially at the national level. For instance, Chesnais (1990) reports that the 
demographic transition may manifest in older age populations over 40 times the size of 
their pre-transition levels in countries such as India, and 100 and 200 times in Mexico 
and Kenya, respectively; given the principles of baseline homophily, such an increase 
will clearly affect the likelihood that a middle aged individual’s parents, aunts and uncles 
are alive and an important force in their lives. In contrast, France, whose demographic 
transition was the slowest and steadiest in the world, saw only a 10 fold increase in their 
old age population. Such differences between countries are stunning, and the 
opportunities for interactions which they influence are critically important. Likewise, 
Ruggles (1986) attributes the demographic change seen in the developed world as a 
necessary condition for the rise of the extended family structure. Indeed, as discussed by 
McPherson et al. (2001: 361): “having kin in one’s network tends to increase contacts 
across age categories (through contacts with grandparents, parents or children), 
                                                 
3 McPherson et al. (2001: 419), state that their definition of inbreeding homophily “does 
not in any sense indicate choice or agency purified of structural factors.” 
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educational strata (because of cohort differences in educational stock), and sex (because 
of the heterosexual nature of marital unions and the sex composition of sibship”. 
When we consider where such interactions occur, it becomes apparent that 
looking at the national level is not ideal. Though a substantial amount of contact occurs 
between spatially distant close kin ties in the developed world, facilitated by telephonic 
and electronic communication (e.g., Onnella et al. 2007), such types of contact are not 
universal. The vast majority of individuals whose inputs are sociologically important 
remain within a small geographic circle of each respondent; the majority of social 
network findings conform to this notion of spatial proximity. Indeed, even in the 
developed world, local, face to face, contact is still thought prominent (Wellman et al. 
2001; Putnam 2000); indeed, the focus on neighborhood and village effects in both the 
developed and developing world speaks to the importance of local face to face interaction 
(Entwisle 2007).  
In addition to being an important locus for examining social networks, there is 
ample evidence of substantial sub-national and even local variation in demographic 
determinants. However, the majority of studies examining demographic change have 
done so at the regional or national scale. As an example of the possibility for local 
variation in demographic determinants, there Entwisle et al. (1996) found substantial 
variation in contraceptive use and fertility patterns between 51 spatially proximate 
villages in Nang Rong district of Northeast Thailand (Entwisle et al. 1996). To further 
underscore the point, social networks were also found to differ between the villages 
(Entwisle et al. 2007), and they were found to have important implications for migration 
(Entwisle et al. 2009). Axinn and Yabiku (2001) found a similar diversity regarding 
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contraceptive use and community integration in the villages of the Chitwan Valley of 
Nepal.  
Whether there is a relationship between such documented local variations in 
demographic determinants and social networks is not fully understood, owing largely to 
the fact that such variations remains understudied (Entwisle 2007). Though considerable 
research efforts have explored the ways in which demographic choices are shaped by 
social structural endowments (Entwisle et al. 1996; Godley 2001; Rindfuss, Choe et al. 
2006; Massey 1987; Sandberg 2005), little research, outside of the household co-
residence literature discussed above, has explored the possibility that demographic 
choices also shape those social structures. That is another recommendation for this study, 
and the reason for its focus on local demographic settings that capture the contextual 
network of relations – beyond the immediate ties within the household – amongst 
individuals. 
 
Simulation Approach 
This paper uses an agent-based model that simulates the demographic behavior of 
individuals in a kinship system
4
 and data from the Nang Rong projects (Nang Rong 
Projects 2008). Such a method is ideal for the study of demographic contributions to 
social network differentiation because it allows for controlled parameter manipulation 
that can isolate how changes in historical demographic patterns play out as lagged 
                                                 
4 This program was developed using Matlab (2007) in conjunction with Peter J. Mucha, 
Katherine Faust, Barbara Entwisle and Ronald R. Rindfuss. I intend to make the code for 
this program and the programs which generates the analyses and parameters discussed in 
this paper available online after publication of the first-paper to result from this work 
pending the agreement of all interested parties. 
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changes in social structure (see Epstein 2006:1-46 for a discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of social simulation; see Macy and Willer (2002) for a review of its 
applications). This is an important contribution as it allows for the testing of bottom-up 
hypotheses about social structural generation (e.g., Robins et al. 2005) that are informed 
by a demographic model of entrance and exit from the population. It has the potential to 
treat kinship structure as an endogenous dependent variable that may, in turn, influence 
demographic patterns, something not feasible in classical survey analysis.  
Such a simulation approach improves on prior models of social network 
interaction (e.g., Robins et al. 2005) and demographic micro-simulation (e.g., Smith and 
Oeppen 1993). Simulation models of social networks test how prohibitions or 
predilections towards friendship or association with different individuals, governed by 
the attributes of those individuals and those individuals’ relational positioning, create 
different types of network structures. One example is the work of Behrman, Moody and 
Stovel (2004) where the authors found that heterosexual adolescent dating networks were 
primarily determined by prohibitions on four cycles (a male dating an ex-girlfirend’s ex-
boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend), rather than by the attributes of the individuals involved. The 
models of social network interaction chiefly suffer in their failure to control the entrance 
and exits of individuals from the population, a key demographic insight. In contrast 
methods of demographic micro-simulation focus on the entrances and exits from the 
population, but have other problems (see critiques in Ruggles 1993; Wachter, Blackwell 
and Hammel 1997) such as their inabilities to allow agent interaction, to model the 
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heritability of traits, and to allow for changing vital rates over time
5
. All of these 
problems are addressed by the agent based microsimulation approach used. Owing to 
these issues, this paper uses an agent based microsimulation approach that combines 
social network simulation with demographic micro-simulation. 
 
Setting of the Model 
I set my analysis in the villages of Nang Rong, Thailand, a location that is ideal 
for a study of this kind owing to its varied demographic history and its present 
differentiation of village kinship networks. In addition, the unique demographic and 
social network data help inform the operation of the model and allow for its empirical 
validation. Nang Rong is one of more than 700 districts in Thailand. Located in the 
Northeastern part of the country, it is approximately the size of a typical county in the 
Eastern United States (1,300 km
2
). It is a rural, primarily rice-growing region. Nang 
Rong was a frontier area for new settlement until the early 1970s (Entwisle et al. 2008; 
Entwisle et al. 2009). Though a few villages have been settled for hundreds of years since 
the region was part of Cambodia, the vast majority are new settlement, the area being 
largely uninhabited until 1900 (Faust et al. 1999). As such, the villages were initially 
characterized by large numbers of in-migrants and high levels of natural increase. Such 
rates of natural increase persisted until the 1960s, when, as with the rest of Thailand 
                                                 
5 These criticisms have led authors to largely abandon such simulation techniques in 
favor of using genealogical data gleaned from parish registers and other sources (e.g., 
Plakans 1984; Ruggles 2007). The use of such data has made vital contributions, but 
those data are typically not available for the developing world (outside of China see Zhao 
1994) and may never be. Further, such data are very sensitive to issues of accuracy and 
incompleteness owing to under-registration of individuals and vital events (see Post et al. 
1997 for an extensive review of these problems; Quinlan and Hagen 2008; Henry 1956). 
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(Knodel et al. 1987), fertility rates began to fall. Despite the drop in fertility and despite 
the closing of the frontier and a general reversal of the migration streams in the 1970s 
(Entwisle et al. 2007; Entwisle et al. 2009), the population of the small villages continued 
to grow until the 1990s. These are, of course, general trends in the region, there was 
likely local variation. 
The villages of Nang Rong remain relatively small, ranging from 19 to 475 
households with an average of about 100 households in 1994 (Faust et al. 1999). In terms 
of individuals, villages ranged from 333 to 1,260 residents with a median of 640 in 2000; 
including migrants not currently residing in the village, these numbers are 475 to 1,600 
with a median of 873. Even though village residents tend to know one another, earlier 
research on Nang Rong has shown that there is substantial variation from one village to 
the next in the patterning of economic and kin ties and that such information 
meaningfully correlates with information flows (Entwisle et al. 2007). 
Because I seek to maximize the validity of my model, I have attempted to mimic 
demographic patterns assumed present in the Nang Rong villages. Because villages have 
been the locus of prior work on social networks in developing countries, and because 
explorations of variation in local level social integration are lacking, I have limited all 
analyses to events that take place within the village. Doing so circumscribes the network 
boundaries (Laumann et al. 1983; Laumann et al. 1992), and focuses on the village as an 
important local context for social life. Who lives in the village depends on fertility, 
mortality and migration patterns, which will in turn dictate the number, nature and 
structure of kin ties within the village. As an example of these restrictions on the network 
boundaries consider the case of a person who enters the village through marriage or as a 
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single person through in-migration; when this happens, they are treated as coming 
without kinship ties (that is, they do not have any ties that are relevant to the population 
of interest). In the pages that follow, I describe other characteristics of the model and 
simulation scenarios to be used before describing the measures by which the model will 
be evaluated. 
 
Demographic Scenarios 
Thailand’s experience with the demographic transition is generally described as 
follows. The mortality transition began around 1950; in the period 1947 to 1960 life 
expectancy at birth increased by about 11 years, with gains in mortality mostly leveled 
off by the year 1980 (Chamratrithirong and Pejaranonda 1986). The fertility transition 
began soon after the mortality transition, in approximately 1960; indeed, marital fertility 
in Thailand fell by about 40% in the decade between 1969 and 1979, with a 10% decline 
having been registered prior to 1969 (Knodel, Havanon, and Pramualratana 1984; 
Caldwell and Caldwell 2006). However, there may have been considerable local variation 
in these trends. In particular, the rural Northeast region where Nang Rong is located is 
likely to have begun its demographic transition somewhat later (Knodel, Havanon, and 
Pramualratana 1984), though it may be that the larger, more developed towns of the 
district had similar experiences to the rest of the country. 
To simplify the analyses of the study proposed, parameters of interest are 
classified into three fertility and three mortality scenarios and stratified by two initial 
conditions to yield a total of 18 combinations. These parameters are intended to mimic 
demographic likelihoods assumed present in Nang Rong villages, but they also strive for 
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sufficient generality to hint at the effects of more broad changes for general 
differentiation in social network form. By considering variations in terms of timing of 
onset, tempo and extent of fertility and mortality decline, some of the variation in 
regional demographic transition patterns seen in table 1 (and table A1 in the appendix) 
will be explored. 
To do this, I begin with three fertility trends and three mortality trends in 
combination for a total of nine scenarios based on changing rates. The panels of figure 1 
depict each of these combinations, by showing the total fertility rate and female life 
expectancy for each scenario (changes in male life expectancy follow the same pattern 
but do not proceed as high, as has been the case empirically (Preston 1980)). In it, the 
fertility scenarios are held constant across the rows while the mortality scenarios are 
constant down the columns. Total fertility rate is read on the left axis of each figure while 
female life expectancy is read on the right axis
6
. In a quick summary, recalling that all 
combinations of fertility and mortality scenarios are tested, mortality scenario one is an 
early onset, quick transition; mortality scenario two is an early onset, slow transition; 
mortality scenario three is a late onset, median transition; fertility scenario one is an early 
                                                 
6 Note that the fertility and mortality scenarios remain constant from years 1900 to 1940 
at the level shown in 1940. Also note that the total fertility rates shown are only 
approximations to make the figure more familiar to demographers, as the underlying 
parameter concerns marital fertility. To convert the age-specific marital fertility rates into 
a total fertility rate, I multiplied each age-specific rate by the proportion of the population 
that considers some form of marriage and summed. This is analogous to the conversion 
of marital fertility rates to total fertility rates given in Preston et al. (2006), but accounts 
for the uncertainty regarding the true proportion of women at each age who are married. 
A further complication of the precision of the fertility rates is that individuals have 
person-specific shifts from the global mean in the likelihood of giving birth in each year, 
as described in appendix B. Thus, the fertility rates presented ought to be viewed as a 
description of the underlying data generating process rather than exact rates that will be 
experienced in the population.      
 19 
onset, gradual transition; fertility scenario two is a late onset, slow initial decline then 
quickened tempo; and fertility scenario three is a late onset, rapid transition. The gap 
between the timing of onset of fertility and mortality decline is longest in the combination 
of fertility scenario two and mortality scenario one, while it is shortest in the combination 
of fertility scenario one and mortality scenario three, where both begin at the same time. 
Thus, the combination of mortality scenario three with fertility scenario three (the bottom 
right panel of figure 1) is the one that appears to most closely conform to the experiences 
of Thailand and will be considered the baseline model. In the other scenarios, I consider 
how things might be different had the demographic transition proceeded differently. 
I begin by asking how the gap between the timing of onset of mortality decline 
and the timing of onset of fertility decline influences social network structure. This gap is 
crucial to the growth of the population and constitutes a substantial difference between 
demographic transitions in developed and developing countries. This is achieved by 
exploring the combinations of fertility and mortality decline (see appendix B for a 
description of the calculation of fertility and mortality parameters). For instance, 
combining mortality scenario 1, where life expectancy begins to rise in 1940 and all gains 
are completed by 1960, with fertility scenario 1, where a drop corresponding to 10% of 
the pre-transition total fertility rate takes place between 1950 and 1960 yields a gap 
between the timing of onsets of fertility and mortality decline of 10 years
7
. In contrast, 
combining mortality scenario three with either fertility scenario two or three, where the 
initial 10% decline from pre-transition levels does not begin until 1960 yields a gap of 20 
years. In general, I expect that longer gaps between the beginning of fertility and 
                                                 
7 Preston (1985b) notes that mortality declines in the developing world slowed in the in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
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mortality decline will create more cohesive social structures, while shorter gaps will 
create less social cohesion in terms of kinship networks. Such a finding will speak to the 
concerns about whether the declining social cohesion observed in developed countries is 
a certain future for developing countries experiencing the demographic transition, as 
developing countries experienced a significantly longer gap between the onsets of 
fertility and mortality decline than developed countries.  
The timing of onset of mortality and fertility decline is also interesting because it 
creates the shape of the age distribution of the population (Coale 1972). As is well-known 
in the demographic literature, when fertility temporarily exceeds mortality it creates a 
larger than usual cohort. This means that for the length of time this occurs, which is 
explored above, there will be a bubble in the age-structure, called the baby-boom in the 
developed world and sometimes referred to as the demographic dividend (Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla 2003). Such a bubble reverberates through the demographic profile 
of a population for many years (cf. Chesnais 1990), and the length of time that has passed 
since its creation will have profound influences on the population. The length of time 
since it was created, which is dictated by the onset of the demographic transition, will 
control whether it means that the plurality of the population has larger numbers of 
children, siblings, or parents than other cohorts. 
Variation in the tempo of fertility and mortality declines – the speed with which 
the rates fall in isolation and combination – is another worthwhile comparison. In my 
scenarios, such a comparison can be achieved by contrasting within the mortality and 
fertility scenarios and by varying combinations of these contrasts. For instance, in 
mortality scenario one, life expectancy rises over a period of 20 years. In contrast, in 
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mortality scenario two, life expectancy rises over a period of 40 years, while in mortality 
scenario three life expectancy rises over a period of 30 years. Similar contrasts can be 
found in the fertility scenarios. Such a comparison is again interesting because of 
differences between the developed and developing regions of the world. Recalling table 
1, broad regions of the world ranged from 12 to 26 years to complete their fertility 
transition, with those which began later (i.e., those outside of Europe) generally 
completing at a faster rate than those which began earlier; as can be seen in the appendix 
table A1, the variation between individual countries is even more extensive than that 
between regions. Whether these differences can be expected to generate different kinship 
structures is an important consideration; I hypothesize that they will. 
In keeping with rural Thai setting, at the start of the model in 1900, several of the 
Nang Rong villages were comprised of young, sparsely kin-linked in-migrants who had 
moved to settle the frontier, while others had been settled for centuries. In addition to 
considerations of the timing of onset, tempo and extent of fertility and mortality decline, I 
explore the contribution of initial village conditions to social network structure. By 
introducing two stylized initial conditions roughly corresponding to those known to have 
existed in the region, I ask to what extent is contemporary kin network differentiation 
influenced by the network differentiation of the past.  
This question has a great deal of substantive importance for those interested in 
local level demographic and social network variation. In developing countries, 
urbanization and intra-rural migration account for a large share of migration (Bilsborrow 
2002). Such large-scale movement of the population results in the establishment of new 
cities, towns and neighborhoods and, consequently, large groups of unconnected 
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individuals in close proximity. Given this, whether places which have experienced such a 
rapid influx of migrants can be expected to fundamentally differ from those which have 
not is a worthwhile consideration. When this phenomenon occurred in the developed 
world, it was of great concern to early sociologists (e.g., Park, Burgess and McKenzie 
1925; Durkheim 1893[1933]; Simmel 1903[1971]). Between places which inherit a 
history of settlement and those which have developed recently, there is also likely to be 
substantial heterogeneity in terms of age-structure and kinship network cohesion. 
Because of this, exploring the impacts of variations in initial conditions is crucial to 
understanding the demographic transition at a local scale.  
The hypothetical villages which I simulate will start from one of two initial 
conditions. In one model meant to represent those villages which had been settled for 
long periods of time, the initial conditions are chosen from a 150 year old established 
village with 70 living members distributed according to age and sex ratios of high 
fertility, high mortality populations and characterized by extensive (within-village) 
kinship links
8
. In the other model that is meant to represent the frontier villages of the 
district that were uninhabited prior to approximately 1900, the initial conditions are 
chosen from a group of 70 recent in-migrants who are predominantly young (ages 15-50) 
and childless with approximately 50% of the women linked to spouses. In all of their 
combinations with the fertility and mortality scenarios, introducing these two sets of 
initial conditions yields a total of 18 scenarios. 
                                                 
8 This initial village is “grown” by simulation. Tracking the village for longer than 150 
years is computationally challenging owing to the number of individuals that live and die. 
In addition, I know of no work attempting to quantify demographic patterns that far back 
in rural Thailand, so choosing accurate input parameters is a challenge. Finally, links 
between individuals connected by large chains of indirect kin are not considered as 
outcomes in this paper, thus growing the village for longer than this is largely irrelevant. 
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These scenarios and their associated parameters are chosen to reflect the 
experience of a frontier region governed by crude presumptions of the temporal evolution 
of Nang Rong villages, but they also encapsulate a diversity of demographic transitions. 
In combination, the 18 scenarios outlined allow for the independent and simultaneous 
examination of the ways in which the timing of fertility and mortality onset, the gap 
between them, the speed with which they progress, and the initial conditions from which 
they are path dependent affect the social structure of the population. 
A thorough treatment of the underlying operation of the model, including the 
rules governing demographic behavior and all additional behavioral parameters (such as 
those relating to migration and marriage) are discussed in appendix B. 
 
Understanding Social Structure 
In measuring kinship structures, it is important to understand both the immediate 
relations of individuals and the broader social network that the compounding of direct 
links generates. Previous analyses have used both measures: while some have relied on 
counts of specific types of kin (e.g., Ruggles 1993; Zhao 2001), others have focused on 
structural properties of the kinship system treated as an entire social network (e.g., 
Entwisle et al. 2007; Entwisle et al. 2009). The work proposed thus uses network analytic 
methods (Wasserman and Faust 1994) to operationalize social structure in both ways, as 
an aggregation of direct relations and as a broader system created by direct and indirect 
relations. 
Three features of kinship structure are considered in order to understand its 
covariance with demographic change: average numbers of close kin, average numbers of 
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indirect kin, and the extent of community connectivity through kinship. These outcomes 
reflect an interest in social structure at the level of the kinship system and will be 
discussed in conjunction with a description of their method of calculation. All measures 
are presented on a subset of the adjacency matrix consisting of the living and resident 
population, but they are calculated on the matrix of all individuals who have ever lived in 
the village because restricting the analysis to those currently living creates missing social 
network data that has been shown to strongly affect social network measures of kinship 
(Verdery et al. 2009). At the end of each simulation run, three adjacency matrices were 
constructed for the population of all individuals who have ever lived in the village by 
assigning a matrix cell (a potential kinship tie) a value of one if the individual represented 
by the row (called the ego) of the matrix is the spouse, child or parent of the individual 
represented by the column of the matrix (called the alter) and a value of 0 otherwise. The 
spousal matrix is symmetric (non-directional) and unweighted, while the child-to-parent 
and parent-to-child matrices are directional and unweighted transposes of each other. 
From here, matrix multiplication and addition was used to calculate the various features 
of interest (algorithms available upon request). 
As much of the literature looking at demographic change and social structure has 
focused on the counts of close kin for the average individual living in the population 
(e.g., Smith and Oeppen 1993; Dykstra and Knipscheer 1995; Ruggles 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1994, 1996, 2007; Ruggles and Goeken 1992; Zhao 2001; Post et al. 1997; Ruggles and 
Heggeness 2008; Kobrin 1976; Soldo 1981), I begin my analyses with that focus. Counts 
of close kin are typically operationalized as the number of living first-degree kinship 
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connections, plus siblings (who are technically second degree kin
9
). Numbers of first-
degree kin and siblings are an important metric because they are a key means of direct 
social support (Shanas 1979; Marks and McLanahan 1973) and condition the broader 
connectivity in the kinship system that someone will enjoy. Further, as I hypothesize that 
the speed of the demographic transition will be negatively correlated with numbers of 
such kin, this is an important metric for contextualizing the findings of McPherson et al. 
(2006) regarding the declining numbers of close confidants of Americans.  
As a second means of understanding changes in social structure, I examine counts 
of more distant kin. Such kin – cousins, grandparents, aunts, uncles and beyond – are 
important for passing information from distant parts of the social network (Entwisle et al. 
2009). Weak ties have long been theorized as crucially important features of social 
networks in the literature (Granovetter 1973). Though weak ties should not be construed 
with indirect relations, it is a reasonable assumption that indirectly related kin are more 
likely “weakly” tied than directly related kin; further, Granovetter (1973) specifies that 
indirect relations are a potential source of weak ties. As a means of understanding how 
varying experiences with the demographic transition relate to differences in counts of 
indirect kin, I examine the mean number of kin individuals have in the second through 
fourth degrees.  
Another important concept in the literature on kinship relations is the extent to 
which information and resources might transfer through the population; the network’s 
                                                 
9 First degree kin are child, parent and spousal ties (see Keyfitz and Caswell 2005; White 
and Moody 2003). Higher order degrees are the defined by the power to which the first 
degree adjacency matrix must be taken to find the kinship connection of interest. Thus 
examples of second degree kin include siblings (parent’s children) and grandparents 
(parent’s parents) while aunts and uncles (parent’s parent’s children) would be third 
degree kin and cousins (parent’s parent’s children’s children) would be fourth degree. 
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potential for “contagion”10. Such a concept has been shown useful to understanding the 
diffusion of innovations (e.g., Rogers 2003), migration (e.g., Entwisle et al. 2009), 
fertility (Entwisle et al. 1996), and other sociologically interesting topics. I measure this 
by considering the percentage of the population reachable in (shortest) kinship paths of 
four or fewer degrees. This measure was singled out as one which is likely to be 
particularly dependent on demographic history, especially that owing to migration 
(Entwisle 2007). 
As two of the three substantive measures - counts of close kin and counts of 
indirect kin - are arguably related to the size of the currently living population, I also 
consider differences in that metric. Considering such differences contextualizes the 
simulation results within more formal metrics of demographic analysis, and increases the 
face-validity of the models when the results conform to what would be expected from the 
demographic scenarios. 
 
Simulation Results 
 In this section, I present simulation results from the agent based model under the 
18 combinations of fertility and mortality scenarios and initial conditions that capture a 
variety of experiences with the demographic transition. To aid in interpretation of the 
results, table 2 breaks down the fertility and mortality scenarios into whether they had a 
late or an early onset and whether they had a rapid or gradual tempo. The classifications 
in table 2 are meant as a heuristic only, as the real classifications are more complex; for 
                                                 
10 I follow Leenders (2002) and use the term contagion to describe any network effect 
including those due to transmission, emulation, or other social process that may operate 
directly or indirectly through the relations in the network. 
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instance, it is clear from figure 1 that the rise in life-expectancy in mortality scenario 
three is somewhere between the rise in life expectancy in the other two scenarios. 
 As 1,000 simulations with different sequences of random numbers were run for 
each scenario, there is considerable variability of estimates. Thus, for each scenario, table 
3 presents the quartiles across the simulations of the features of kinship networks 
discussed in the last section as measured in the simulation year 2000. Within the table, 
results are grouped according to kinship network feature, with combinations of fertility, 
mortality and initial conditions outlined. As the aim of this paper is to show meaningful 
differences in kinship network structures related to the demographic transition, I evaluate 
the models using two criteria. First, I consider substantial differences between models as 
those where the interquartile ranges do not overlap. Second, I consider distinguishable 
differences between the models as those where the interquartile range of one model does 
not overlap the median of another.  
 This form of differentiation between the models relies on the notion that many of 
the processes explored are inherently stochastic. Thus, the distribution of observed 
features of kinship networks found for any scenario is taken to be the range of likely 
outcomes given stochastic variability around the data generating process. By considering 
two scenarios as substantially different when the interquartile ranges of their observed 
distributions do not overlap, I am assuming that the differences in the data generating 
processes between the two scenarios - in this case their relative experience with the 
demographic transition - yields different results that are outside the realm of what would 
be expected at random. 
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 The gap between the timing of onset of mortality and fertility declines was a key 
feature that motivated my choices of demographic scenarios. To explore this, I consider 
the simulation results holding fertility scenario constant. Recalling from table 2 (and 
figure 1) that the mortality transition began early in scenarios one and two and late in 
scenario three, we would expect to see the influence of this gap in comparing these 
scenarios. As the tempo of change in mortality scenarios two and three were rather 
similar, this is the best comparison to isolate the influence of a gap in the timing of onset 
of mortality decline. 
 For population currently alive, for numbers of close kin, for numbers of indirect 
kin, and for village connectivity, there is not a single substantial difference related to the 
length of time between mortality declines and fertility declines. Indeed, for all of the 
dependent variables, in all of the fertility scenarios, whether the simulation began from a 
new village or an established one, there is not a single instance where the influence of 
this gap exceeds the influence of the stochastic randomness introduced. That is, while the 
values for the early onset scenario (two) are consistently larger than those for the later 
onset scenario (three), there is not a single instance where the median of the simulation 
runs for early onset is greater than the third quartile of simulation runs for late onset. 
Generally, the average individual living in an early onset scenario had more close and 
indirect kin than the average individual living in a later onset scenario, and the average 
village was more connected. Yet, these are not large differences; the average individual 
who lived in a newly established village in which the mortality transition began early had 
almost 0.1 more close kin and around 0.7 more indirect kin than someone who lived in a 
new village with a late mortality transition onset. That the late onset scenario, with its 
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more contemporary onset of mortality decline, did not generate significant differences 
from the earlier onset scenario also suggests that the duration of time that has passed 
since the demographic transition began does significantly influence the structure of 
kinship networks.  
 However, holding fertility scenario constant, there are several instances of 
distinguishable and substantial differences between mortality scenario one (early onset, 
rapid tempo) and mortality scenarios two (early onset, gradual tempo) and three (late 
onset, median tempo). Recalling that life expectancy rises over a period of 20 years in 
mortality scenario one, over a period of 40 years in mortality scenario two, and over a 
period of 30 years in mortality scenario three, such differences between scenarios could 
be attributed to the differential tempo of the increase in life-expectancy. Were the tempo 
of life-expectancy increase responsible for differences in kinship structure between the 
mortality scenarios outlined, we would expect that, within fertility scenarios, the rapid 
tempo scenario (one) would be more similar to the median tempo scenario (three) than to 
the gradual tempo scenario (two) because of the length of time it took life expectancy to 
rise from its initial low to its resultant high. However, the results do not conform to this 
expectation, as the estimates are generally more similar between the rapid tempo scenario 
and the gradual tempo scenario than they are between other combinations. Such a finding 
suggests that the tempo of mortality increase is not the principle mechanism generating 
differences in kinship structure. 
 Instead, it seems that the length of time that a society experiences both high 
fertility and low mortality - its exposure to population growth - is the driver of 
differences between kinship structures. This is a more complex interpretation, relating to 
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the interaction of the timing of onset and the tempo of increase in life-expectancy. 
Continuing the comparison within fertility scenarios, mortality scenario one reaches its 
maximum level of life expectancy most rapidly and during any of the transition years has 
the highest life expectancy. Mortality scenario two, though it reaches its maximum life 
expectancy at the same time as mortality scenario three, begins its onset earlier than 
mortality scenario three, thereby exposing the population living through it to a longer 
period of low mortality probabilities. In other words, within fertility scenarios, those 
mortality scenarios wherein life-expectancy and fertility are simultaneously high for 
longer periods of time generate larger numbers of people alive, close kin, indirect kin and 
greater levels of village connectivity. That mortality scenario two and three are generally 
more similar in terms of life-expectancy at any point during the period between 
approximately 1955 and 1980 - a good portion of the mortality transition - than they are 
to mortality scenario one drives home this point. This is the only consistent finding with 
regards to mortality, and it explains the majority of the differences between the mortality 
scenarios. 
 Thus far I have looked at the influence of the gap between the three demographic 
transitions in terms of their timing of onset, their tempo of decline, and the length of time 
that mortality and fertility are simultaneously high in terms of mortality, that is, holding 
fertility scenario constant. However, it is equally important to compare the results in 
terms of fertility. Indeed, in so doing, one of the most consistent findings to emerge from 
this paper becomes apparent: that differences in the fertility scenarios generate 
substantially larger differences in the features of kinship networks than differences in 
mortality scenarios. 
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 Evaluating the relative timing of onset of fertility transitions within mortality 
scenarios, table 2 highlights that the fertility decline began early in fertility scenario one 
and later in fertility scenarios two and three. Thus, were timing of onset of fertility 
decline driving differences in kinship networks, we would expect fertility scenario two 
and three to be more similar to each other than they either is to fertility scenario one. 
Such a result is found: the early onset scenario (one) generates substantially smaller 
numbers of close kin than either of the later onset scenarios (two and three) in almost all 
fertility scenarios, and the same general pattern holds for indirect kin. These differences 
are large: comparing fertility scenarios one and two, the average individual living in a 
new village had about 0.8 more close kin and three more indirect kin than the average 
individual living in a village where the fertility transition began earlier. Village 
connectivity exhibits the same general trends, but they are more muted. New villages 
where the fertility transition began later were about an additional 0.15% more connected 
than villages where it began earlier. Interestingly, differences between numbers of living 
population members also exhibit the same pattern, though, as with connectivity, none of 
the differences are substantial. Unlike from the mortality perspective, it appears that the 
gap between the timing of onset of the mortality transition and the timing of onset of 
fertility transition is a substantial influence on close and indirect kin. However, as was 
seen when looking from the mortality perspective, such a gap does not appear to generate 
substantial differences between village connectivity and population size. 
 Were the tempo of fertility decline the most significant force influencing kinship 
structure, table 2 suggests that fertility scenarios one and two will be more similar to each 
other than they are to fertility scenario three, holding mortality scenario constant. For 
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close kin this does not seem to be the case. Indeed there is a larger difference between the 
two gradual tempo scenarios (one and two), with fertility scenario two consistently 
generating the largest numbers of kin and fertility scenario one generating the smallest 
such numbers, than there is between scenarios one and three. Examining indirect kin 
makes this point even more clear, as in all cases fertility scenario one generates 
substantially smaller numbers of indirect kin than fertility scenario two, but only 
distinguishably smaller numbers of such kin than fertility scenario three. The general 
point is further highlighted in an exploration of connectivity and population sizes - 
distinguishable differences exist in all of the contrasts between fertility scenarios one and 
two, but in only one of the six potential contrasts between fertility scenarios one and 
three. Though substantial differences were found between scenarios that began from a 
new village, the evidence is less strong when considering those which began from an 
established village. For close kin, there are substantial differences between fertility 
scenarios one and two and noticeable differences between fertility scenarios one and 
three, but the general trend of diminishing differences for indirect kin and for 
connectivity and population size persists. Indeed, there is not a single distinguishable 
difference between the fertility scenarios in terms of connectivity or population size when 
they begin from an established village.  
 As it did between the mortality scenarios, considering exposure to population 
growth draws attention to the main dimension of stratification between the fertility 
scenarios. When the population experiences a gradual decline in fertility with a late onset 
(as in fertility scenario two), the simulated village is exposed to the longest period of high 
fertility. In contrast, when the decline in fertility begins early and proceeds more rapidly 
 33 
(as in fertility scenario one), there is a short period of population growth. Thus, the 
consistent finding that, holding mortality scenarios constant, fertility scenario one yields 
kinship structures least similar to fertility scenario two confirms this finding. And, of 
course, being exposed to longer periods of high fertility generates larger population sizes 
as the results show. That such contrasts are more apparent considering first degree kin 
and siblings than they are in the estimates of indirect kin or village connectivity, and that 
they are more prevalent in the new village scenarios than the old village scenarios is 
again seen. 
 Finally, the demographic scenarios considered in this paper also acknowledged 
the influence of initial conditions, a key feature of local variation in demographic 
processes. To do this, I modeled the same combinations of fertility and mortality 
scenarios from an initial village which displayed the kinship networks and population 
structure of a newly founded place and from an initial village which had been simulated 
for 150 years prior to the start of the model, thus reflecting the kinship networks and 
population structure of a place which had been established for a long time and 
experienced demographic conditions thought to characterize historic Thailand. In 
evaluating the influence of these initial conditions, I pay attention to the differences 
between the simulations beginning from the new and established village within the same 
fertility and mortality combinations. 
 Comparing the results obtained from the same sets of fertility and mortality 
scenarios when they originated from the new or the established village brings to light 
another consistent finding. In no instance, for any of the features of kinship networks 
considered, are the new village scenarios substantially different from the old village 
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scenarios. That is, there is overlap in the results that owes to the random processes 
generating the data, suggesting that such differences exert a greater influence over the 
results than the initial conditions from which the model began. However, a secondary 
trend comes to light. In many cases, the interquartile range of estimates obtained in the 
established village scenarios encompass the interquartile range of estimates obtained 
from the new village scenarios. I attribute this finding to the longer periods during which 
the established villages were subjected to both high fertility and high mortality. Such 
conditions yield highly variable estimates, as the population may crash or grow rapidly 
prior to the initiation of the demographic transition. Another interpretation is simply that 
the longer history allows for random fluctuations to make a larger difference. 
 As a whole, the results indicate that even slightly differing experiences with the 
demographic transition matter a great deal for kinship network structures, but that this is 
more true for some features of kinship networks than others. That extremely variable 
estimates are obtained when populations are exposed to long periods of high fertility and 
high mortality is another interesting finding. Considering these findings in broader 
context, they suggest that the wildly differing experiences with the demographic 
transition in different parts of the world can be expected to generate different kinship 
networks. Furthermore, it can be expected that places which have not yet, or only very 
recently, begun the demographic transition will have substantial heterogeneity in kinship 
network structures in the present and near future, owing to the long period of exposure to 
uncertain demographic conditions. In this vein, fertility scenario two yields the largest 
interquartile ranges of all fertility scenarios, while fertility scenario one yields the 
smallest. Indeed, that the mortality scenarios are not as consistently delineated into which 
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yields the largest and smallest interquartile ranges of estimates is consistent with the 
conclusion that variation in fertility decline matters more for kinship structure than 
variation in mortality decline. 
 
Validating the Model 
 Though the simulation approach used presents an analytical tool for evaluating 
demographic contributions to social network differentiation, simulation methods are met 
with skepticism if they cannot generate, given the proper parameter specifications, 
network forms that encompass the range of those observed in a real world setting. In 
order to validate the model, I make use of the diversity of kinship relations in the 51 
villages of Nang Rong (Rindfuss et al. 2004; Entwisle et al. 2009). Such diversity is a 
key strength of the Nang Rong data, whose detailed accounts of kinship and demographic 
history can be analyzed for overlap with the demographic scenarios used. 
To do this, I assess the extent to which the distribution of kinship counts and 
connectivity generated in the simulations fall within the distributions represented by the 
51 Nang Rong villages. Through exploratory analysis and by comparing the quartiles of 
the kin count distributions, I compare the distributions found in the simulations and those 
in Nang Rong, focusing on whether the simulations encompass the range of kin 
distributions found in Nang Rong. Table 4 presents such summary statistics for the 
distribution (across the 51 villages) of counts of close and indirect kin and kinship 
connectivity found in Nang Rong villages in 2000, corresponding approximately to the 
simulation results from year 100. As was presented in table 3 for the simulated villages, 
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the results in table 4 are restricted to living individuals who were ever residents of Nang 
Rong villages (and thus include migrants).  
As can be seen, the models generate counts of close and indirect kin and 
connectivity that are plausible representations of the diversity found in Nang Rong. 
Though the model-generated kinship structures do not perfectly overlap with the 
experience of Nang Rong villages as the empirical case tends to indicate greater levels of 
indirect kin and connectivity, it is important to note that such simple and stylized models 
can generate kinship structures that are within the range of those found in the empirical 
case. Such plausibility of estimates speaks to the importance of considering local 
variation in experience with the demographic transition. It is important to notice that the 
interquartile ranges found in table 4, for all variables, are much greater than those found 
within any fertility-mortality-initial conditions scenario combination in the simulated 
data. One potential interpretation of this is that the Nang Rong villages had much more 
variability in their experiences with migration, which, as per the design of the analyses in 
this paper, was held constant in all scenarios. Such variability has been suggested by 
Entwisle and colleagues (Entwisle 2007; Entwisle et al. 2007), but exploring its influence 
is outside of the scope of this paper, especially given that such networks have been 
argued to influence migration (Massey et al. 1993). A second reason relates to the 
differential timing of settlement of the Nang Rong villages; as stated above, some were 
settled centuries ago while others were settled as recently as the last 75 years. 
Notably, the range of key features of kinship networks found in Nang Rong 
overlap a number of the demographic transition scenarios used as data-generating 
models. That the breadth of kinship structures found within one district in rural Thailand 
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could be generated by such a variety of experiences with the demographic transition 
further underscores a broader point of this paper, that variation in demographic history 
across both small and large areas of the globe will have important implications for the 
present structure of those societies, at least in terms of social network differentiation. To 
the extent that kinship network differentiation has meaningful impacts on social 
processes (as suggested by the numerous articles reviewed above), demographic history 
may contribute importantly to explaining variation in all sorts of social processes. 
 
Sensitivities 
 Having established that the features of the kinship networks obtained through 
simulation are within the range of possibility of those seen in Nang Rong, in this section I 
consider the sensitivity of my simulation results to other aspects of the model which have 
not hitherto been the focus of this paper. I first consider the lag between the timing of the 
demographic transition and the evidence of differentiation in kinship networks that 
evolves from different transitions. I then ask whether turning off the parameter reflecting 
the heritability of fertility preferences substantially alters the results. Finally, I assess how 
the model's results change when migration not due to exogamous marriage is disallowed. 
Though these three considerations do not cover the entire range of possible alternative 
models and thus cannot offer exhaustive tests of whether variable experiences with the 
demographic transition creates differentiation in kinship network form, they do cover a 
range of alternatives that substantially differ from those presented above and that are of 
theoretical and substantive interest to demographers. 
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 To generalize the results of this model from rural Thailand to other places in the 
world is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some traction on the issue can be 
gained by exploring how the relative timing of the demographic transition and the timing 
of the measurement of kinship network differentiation. Figures 2, 3, and 4 present the 
median results for all 18 scenarios for close kin, indirect kin, and village connectivity, 
respectively, on an annual basis for years 40-100. To make evident the relative 
contributions of fertility and mortality, those figures are organized as follows. Lines 
depicting results from fertility scenario one are black, lines depicting results from fertility 
scenario two are blue, and lines depicting results from fertility scenario three are red. The 
mortality scenarios are indicated by the markers on the lines: mortality scenario one has 
no markers, mortality scenario two has circular markers, and mortality scenario three has 
triangular markers. The results are subdivided into those scenarios emanating from a new 
village and those scenarios emanating from an established village. 
 It is apparent that color (fertility) organizes the results better than marker type 
(mortality) for counts of kin, while the opposite is true for village connectivity. This 
conforms to the general discussion above concerning the relative importance of fertility 
and mortality. To get a sense of the influence of the lag between changes in demographic 
patterns and measurement of the results, it is important to look at the trajectory of the 
results over time. Looking at counts of close and indirect kin, it appears that the 
differentiation in kinship networks discussed above is not fully realized until 
approximately year 90. Prior to year 75 the mortality transition seems to exhibit a larger 
influence, as would be expected owing to its earlier onset. Connectivity on the other hand 
reaches its maximum level of differentiation around year 80, when the mortality 
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transition has completed in all scenarios. Interestingly, differentiation between scenarios 
in terms of connectivity appears to be decreasing, while it remains relatively persistent 
for counts of kin. It is important to note that during the demographic transition, when 
fertility and mortality are changing, there is still a great deal of differentiation between 
the demographic scenarios; noticeable gaps between the models generally occur between 
years 50 and 65, which is compelling as all scenarios experienced the same vital rates 10-
25 years prior. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the demographic transition 
makes a large impact on kinship networks relatively early. 
 Another important question related to the lag between the demographic transition 
and the differentiation of kinship networks is whether the present differentiation of 
kinship networks might owe to the relatively short lag since the demographic transition 
took place. To explore this issue, I project the model from the year 2000, when all 
parameters are equal in all scenarios, into the future using transformations of the United 
Nations' median variant life-expectancy and age-specific fertility rate projections for 
Thailand (United Nations 2008a; United Nations 2008b). The goal of this exercise is not 
to speculate about how future demographic influences will impact social network forms; 
rather, it is an attempt to quantify whether what we currently observe in terms of kinship 
network differentiation is likely to persist over a long time. I evaluate this influence of 
time on the models by examining differences in features of kinship networks in year 150 
compared to year 100.  
 Table 5 presents the quartiles of the simulation results in year 150 as table 3 did in 
year 100. Two interesting features of this table are immediately evident. First, even after 
50 additional years during which there is no differentiation in terms of fertility and 
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mortality levels, or indeed in any part of the model, significant differences between the 
scenarios persist. Keeping in mind that all scenarios were subjected to the exact same 
parameters - probabilities of giving birth and dying drawn from the United Nations 
median variant projections for Thailand - from years 100 to 150, it is remarkable that 
such differences persist between the scenarios. Second, the features of the kinship 
networks are greatly different in years 100 and 150; indeed, the average person has about 
3 fewer close kin in year 150 than the average person did in year 100. The differences are 
so marked that the average person had about the same number of close kin in year 100 as 
the average person had in indirect kin in year 150. 
 Though the medians of all network features have changed dramatically over the 
50 simulated years between 2000 and 2050, different scenario combinations - principally 
those stemming from differences in fertility scenarios - produce results outside of the 
realm expected at random. Indeed, in terms of differences between the models, the same 
general trends observed in year 2000 are present in year 2050, even though all models 
experienced an additional 50 years of simulation with the same fertility and mortality 
parameters. Such a result suggests that differences in kinship network structures owing to 
the location-specific experience with the demographic transition are likely to persist over 
a long period of time and likely to be found in post-transitional societies which completed 
their demographic transition long ago. Further, comparing whether the timing of 
transition onset, the tempo of transition or the duration of exposure to population growth 
best explains the differences between models, it appears that, as was found in year 2000, 
exposure to growth best explains the differentiation of kinship structures. Again, the 
 41 
differences between the scenarios suggest that it is the fertility transition which 
conditions such kinship network differentiation rather than the mortality transition. 
 Examining the model's sensitivity to the parameter reflecting heritability of 
fertility preferences demonstrates the robustness of the model to this analytic choice. 
Here, I compare the extent to which the key features of kinship networks in the baseline 
scenario (fertility three mortality three beginning from a new village) differ when 
individuals inherit no fertility preferences from their parents. These considerations are 
presented in table 6 for years 50, 100 and 150, with results for the baseline scenario 
included for ease of comparison. As would be expected given that high fertility parents 
give birth to greater numbers of children with high fertility preferences, the model 
without preference exhibits slightly smaller numbers on all kinship network features of 
interest. However, in no instance is the model without fertility preferences substantially 
different than the model with them, suggesting that the model is not terribly sensitive - at 
least over the time frame considered and with respect to the features of kinship networks 
analyzed - to introduced correlations between mothers and daughters in terms of numbers 
of children. 
  Here, I explore the model's sensitivity to the elimination of migration not due to 
exogamous marriage. The results in this regard are interesting and show the differential 
sensitivities of features of kinship networks to the assumptions about migration. Though 
the model lacking migration consistently exhibits substantially smaller populations and 
much greater levels of connectivity than the model including it, the same is generally not 
true for close or indirect kin. Though the numbers of close and indirect kin are 
distinguishable between the model excluding migration and the one including it, that 
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greater differences were not found is surprising given the importance attributed to 
migration in the literature (e.g., Entwisle 2007). However, the type of migration 
considered in this paper – migration for purposes other than marriage – is a very 
particular type of migration, and the results may not be directly comparable to those 
theoretically posited. Comparing this finding between years 100 and 150, it seems that 
migration matters more the longer in the past the demographic transition occurred. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 In The Metropolis and Mental Life, Georg Simmel (1903[1971]) posited that 
individuals who live in cities were fundamentally different than those who live in rural 
areas. The work presented in this paper builds on this idea by showing that the 
demographic antecedents of urbanization – the surplus of births over deaths stemming 
from the demographic transition – fundamentally alter the social embeddedness of 
individuals in kinship networks.  Of course, demographic history is only one of the many 
factors that changed social organization so dramatically during the early industrial era, 
and only one of the factors that contributed to urbanization. But, by considering how the 
demographic transition altered social relations in the rural areas which send migrants, 
rather than the urban areas which receive them, this paper has shown that social 
organization has changed more broadly; a result which calls into question the single 
minded focus on the social lives of individuals in urban areas.  
 This work also builds on the classic sociological concepts of organic and 
mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1893[1933]). Whereas Durkheim posited that social 
organization changed fundamentally from a system wherein individuals were 
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homogenous and extensively linked by kinship – mechanical solidarity – to a system 
where individuals were increasingly differentiated and linked by other forms of social 
contact – organic solidarity. He held that these changes owed to the specialization of 
employment and economic development, an increased division of labor. Considering the 
results of this paper in that light, the results in this paper suggest that Durkheim’s 
understanding of the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity may be confounded with 
demographic changes, an argument presupposed by Simmel (1903[1971]). This is not to 
say that broad scale economic development did not contribute to changes in social 
organization, nor that they were somehow less important than demographic factors, it is 
only to note that they likely occurred simultaneously. Indeed, as the literature has not 
untangled whether economic development leads to demographic changes or whether the 
relationship is in the other direction, consideration of this topic is purely speculative. 
 Another contribution of this paper is its focus on the broader networks of relations 
amongst kin, rather than on the more measurable variable, domestic co-residence. Prior 
analyses of kinship networks and demography in the simulation tradition have primarily 
focused on prediction and attempting to resolve debates over the numbers of kin 
individuals have (cf. Ruggles 1993; Wachter, Blackwell and Hammel 1997). I have taken 
a different tack in this paper, using the simulation method to ask whether differences in 
experience with the demographic transition can generate different kinship network 
structures. The results obtained are complex, but they all point to one conclusion: 
demographic history matters for current social structures. Of course, kinship netwoks are 
but one type of network, and, though it is likely that demographic changes impacted other 
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types of social interactions, a rigorous exploration of that topic is well outside the scope 
of this paper. 
 I considered the independent role of fertility and mortality transitions in 
determining these processes, finding evidence that fertility transitions matter more for the 
aspects of social structure related to kinship than mortality transitions - at least in the 
range associated with demographic transitions. I also considered the staying power of 
social network differentiation that was determined by demographic processes, finding 
that such features can be expected to persist over a long time. Further, I found little 
evidence in the simulations that social structures related to counts of available kin were 
likely to be different when the migration regime differs dramatically; however, as 
hypothesized by Entwisle (2007), community connectivity appears to be influenced by 
migration. Finally, I found that initial conditions matter less than experience with the 
demographic transition in determining kinship structures, though a secondary trend 
suggests that longer periods of demographic uncertainty leads to greater variability in 
terms of kinship network structures.  
 The results in this paper cannot definitively answer how much change in kinship 
networks can be attributed to the demographic transition, yet they overwhelmingly point 
to the idea that the transition, no matter how it proceeded, has had substantial impacts on 
kinship networks. It appears that fertility matters more than mortality and that exposure to 
longer periods of population growth matters more than either the timing of onset of the 
tempo of fertility and mortality decline. Many of these findings conform to classical 
theories of demography, and they suggest that demographic considerations should be 
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taken into account in explanations of social structural differentiation, an argument long 
espoused in the literature on demography and social networks as reviewed above. 
 The focus on one particular case - the historical evolution of Nang Rong villages -
is both a strength and a limitation of this work. On the one hand, focusing the model so 
specifically allows me to isolate the influences of slightly different experiences with the 
demographic transition. But, on the other hand, it leaves open the question of whether 
such results would be found elsewhere. For instance, one might ask whether such 
variability is likely to be present in societies long past the demographic transition, such as 
by comparing the United States and France. However, to this end, the results concerning 
persistent kinship network differentiation long into the future (nearly 100 years after the 
onset of the demographic transition) suggest that such findings would be obtained. 
 Recalling table 1, which showed the median dates of fertility decline and the 
tempo of that decline also gives some context to the results found in this paper. The 
fertility transition took between 11 and 26 years to decline from 10% off of the baseline 
to 40% in broad regions of the world, and the results presented in this paper considered a 
range of about 15-25 years. In addition, the results presented in this paper considered 
fertility declines that happened 100 years ago, about the length of time that has passed 
since the fertility decline in Europe and "English speaking 'Europe Overseas'", as well as 
fertility declines which began only recently (as seen in sub-Saharan Africa). This is not to 
say that the trends in Thailand are similar to those experienced elsewhere in the world, 
only that the range of variability considered in this paper, though grounded in the 
experience of Thailand, is extensive and covers much of the variability seen around the 
globe. 
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 Figures 2-4 and table 5 suggested that, while we might still expect differences in 
kinship structures owing to the demographic transition for such regions - differences in 
counts of kin for Europe and differences in connectivity for sub-Saharan Africa - the 
largest differences should be found in those countries where the fertility transition 
occurred in the 1950s to 1970s, including most of Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean. These differences would be due to differences in the timing of onset, tempo of 
change, and exposure to population growth between countries in these regions. Generally, 
the differentiation in kinship networks owing to variation in demographic experiences is a 
mid-range phenomenon that increases shortly after the demographic transition and, 
though it persists for a long period of time, begins decreasing after about 50 years after 
the onset of the demographic transition. 
 Another weakness related to focusing on the case of Nang Rong is that rural 
Thailand is primarily a sending population in terms of migrants. There are many 
examples of sending populations in the world, as places which have recently experienced 
the demographic transition have also typically experienced a concomitant increase in 
population size, which leads the “excess” population to move out. What the implications 
of such changes might be for a receiving population are beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, some intuition can be gained. The sensitivity check that explored removing the 
migration parameters showed that community connectivity is significantly higher when 
there is no migration in or out. This implies that for receiving areas, connectivity will also 
be lower as the amount of migration is larger. Of course, this depends on the extent to 
which those moving to the receiving area are kin linked, and the extent to which ethnic 
(or migration determined) homogamy prevails. 
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 Though this paper was not attempting to show that the findings of increasing 
social network isolation are due to demography, it has made suggestions in that regard. 
Indeed, one of the largest differences between the simulation results for 2000 and 2050 
are the dramatically smaller numbers of available kin and lower levels of community 
connectivity. Looking to table 5, the collapse in kinship networks occurred after year 100, 
or about 30 and 50 years after the onset of the demographic transition. Such a result 
contextualizes the findings of McPherson et al. (2006) and others, and, given the 
literature's focus on kin-based social support for elderly individuals (e.g., de Souza and 
Grundy 2007; Berkman et al. 2000), suggests that the long-term viability of such support 
is indeed worth worrying about.  
 Considering the vast array of demographic transitions throughout the world, the 
findings in this paper suggest that available kinship networks will differ by country and, 
potentially, by sub-national region or even more local contexts owing to differential 
experiences with the demographic transition. To that end, the results presented in this 
paper call into question the viability of considering aggregated measures of kinship 
structures, a result echoed in Entwisle et al. (2007) and espoused in the community 
effects literature (cf. Entwisle 2007). Attention to local variability is an important avenue 
for future research; this paper contributes to the literature by suggesting that we look to 
historical demography to explain some of that variation. 
 Finally, the most important contribution of this paper is its demonstration that 
demography matters. Looking outside of household co-residence is important to 
understand the breadth of social structural changes that have occurred as the demographic 
transition has shaped societies. Considering that demographic history reverberates 
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through the life-course of a society, it is important to consider the ways in which present 
demographic policies and events may influence future social structures and, in turn, 
individual experiences in terms of political participation, health, economic success and 
other outcomes of interest to sociologists. For instance, what will be the impact of the 
dramatic reversal in life-expectancies owing to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan 
Africa? What are the implications of the long running levels of below replacement 
fertility seen in Eastern Europe? For kinship structures, this paper has offered one step in 
the direction of considering such implications, but important work must be done 
translating these kinship structures into outcomes of interest to sociologists. The broad 
point that demographic transitions matter for social structures suggests that attention to 
these demographic trends is more than merited.  
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Table 1. Patterns of fertility declines in regions of the world. 
Region 
 
Median Date of Onset 
of Decline (10% 
Decline) 
Average period 
from 10 to 40% 
decline (Years) 
English speaking "Europe Overseas" 1878 20 
Europe 1910 26 
Spanish speaking "Europe Overseas" NA 22.5 
Early Industrial Asia 1930-35 15 
Ex-USSR Asia 1950-70 15 
Caribbean 1965-70 12 
Other Oceanic 1970-75 11 
South America 1970-75 12 
Central America 1975-80 12.5 
Mainstream Asia 1975-80 12 
North Africa 1980 15 
Middle East 1980-85 15 
Sub-Saharan Africa >1990-95 20 
Notes: Reproduced from Caldwell and Caldwell (2006: 226); the regional groupings are 
argued within that text. Also see table A1 in the appendix. NA denotes not available. 
Figure 1. Combinations of fertility and mortality scenarios used in the analysis. 
5
0
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Table 2. Cross-classifications of the demographic scenarios considered. 
T
im
in
g
 o
f 
o
n
se
t  Tempo of transition 
 Gradual  Rapid 
Early 
 
M2  M1 
F1   
    
Late 
 
F2  M3 
  F3 
 Note: Dichotomies only considered, refer to figure 1 for a true picture of the scenarios.
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Table 3. Medians and interquartile ranges of features of kinship networks in year 100. 
   New Village  Established Village 
   Mort. 1 Mort. 2 Mort. 3  Mort. 1 Mort. 2 Mort. 3 
Population 
Alive 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 684 618 587  295 285 239 
Median 800 722 676  618 543 493 
75th Pct. 912 828 771  1,105 966 884 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 887 799 733  416 367 321 
Median 1,031 931 863  813 710 646 
75th Pct. 1,184 1,070 984  1,395 1,242 1,161 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 762 690 635  360 325 288 
Median 882 794 730  715 620 589 
75th Pct. 1,007 916 844  1,192 1,080 989 
          
Close Kin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 4.30 4.13 4.02  4.16 3.98 3.84 
Median 4.44 4.27 4.16  4.43 4.24 4.09 
75th Pct. 4.58 4.40 4.30  4.63 4.43 4.30 
          
Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 5.10 4.91 4.82  4.99 4.77 4.65 
Median 5.24 5.06 4.97  5.24 5.04 4.89 
75th Pct. 5.38 5.21 5.10  5.43 5.25 5.12 
          
Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 4.61 4.41 4.29  4.49 4.25 4.17 
Median 4.75 4.57 4.45  4.72 4.52 4.42 
75th Pct. 4.91 4.71 4.61  4.93 4.72 4.61 
          
Indirect Kin 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 10.05 9.23 8.57  8.26 7.53 7.00 
Median 11.14 10.21 9.61  10.82 9.59 8.83 
75th Pct. 12.20 11.11 10.45  12.75 11.33 10.63 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 13.20 11.91 11.25  11.26 10.14 9.29 
Median 14.37 13.08 12.36  13.78 12.47 11.52 
75th Pct. 15.49 14.21 13.54  16.36 14.66 13.82 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 11.52 10.49 9.77  9.87 8.75 8.29 
Median 12.69 11.66 10.86  12.03 10.95 10.29 
75th Pct. 13.91 12.70 11.87  14.32 13.07 12.21 
          
Connectivity 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 1.23 1.12 1.03  0.78 0.70 0.65 
Median 1.34 1.21 1.13  1.05 0.94 0.84 
75th Pct. 1.45 1.33 1.24  1.45 1.25 1.15 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 1.38 1.27 1.20  0.94 0.84 0.80 
Median 1.50 1.38 1.31  1.25 1.14 1.06 
75th Pct. 1.64 1.51 1.44  1.77 1.60 1.49 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 1.33 1.21 1.13  0.88 0.77 0.71 
Median 1.45 1.31 1.24  1.13 1.04 0.95 
75th Pct. 1.57 1.43 1.35  1.56 1.42 1.31 
Note: Connectivity multiplied by 100. 
 53 
Table 4. Summary statistics of kinship counts and connectivity found in Nang Rong. 
 Close Kin Indirect Kin Connectivity 
Minimum 4.17 8.17 0.84 
25th Percentile 4.72 12.77 1.47 
Median 4.96 14.06 1.86 
75th Percentile 5.38 17.59 2.18 
Maximum 6.42 29.38 3.62 
Note: Connectivity multiplied by 100. Nang Rong data from year 2000. 
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Table 5. Medians and interquartile ranges of features of kinship networks in year 150. 
   New Village  Established Village 
   Mort. 1 Mort. 2 Mort. 3  Mort. 1 Mort. 2 Mort. 3 
Population 
Alive 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 430 384 359  181 178 149 
Median 501 448 421  390 340 311 
75th Pct. 582 518 485  701 601 551 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 632 562 515  290 259 230 
Median 735 657 612  579 510 453 
75th Pct. 851 761 704  992 879 820 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 483 433 400  233 203 183 
Median 564 506 466  461 389 368 
75th Pct. 648 587 543  762 681 622 
          
Close Kin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 1.53 1.50 1.48  1.45 1.42 1.40 
Median 1.61 1.59 1.56  1.58 1.56 1.54 
75th Pct. 1.69 1.67 1.63  1.69 1.67 1.65 
          
Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 1.96 1.91 1.90  1.88 1.84 1.81 
Median 2.04 2.01 1.99  2.02 2.00 1.97 
75th Pct. 2.13 2.09 2.08  2.14 2.13 2.10 
          
Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 1.59 1.55 1.53  1.50 1.48 1.44 
Median 1.66 1.63 1.62  1.63 1.60 1.59 
75th Pct. 1.74 1.71 1.70  1.74 1.70 1.69 
          
Indirect Kin 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 2.65 2.46 2.29  2.13 2.00 1.86 
Median 2.97 2.76 2.59  2.79 2.57 2.43 
75th Pct. 3.31 3.07 2.92  3.37 3.13 2.97 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 4.41 4.01 3.84  3.69 3.36 3.19 
Median 4.84 4.47 4.24  4.62 4.25 3.99 
75th Pct. 5.24 4.87 4.69  5.51 5.04 4.78 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 3.07 2.83 2.70  2.53 2.32 2.17 
Median 3.46 3.16 3.06  3.26 2.94 2.84 
75th Pct. 3.79 3.50 3.36  3.83 3.55 3.38 
          
Connectivity 
 
 
 
 
Fert. 
1 
 
25th Pct. 0.16 0.15 0.14  0.11 0.10 0.09 
Median 0.18 0.17 0.16  0.14 0.13 0.12 
75th Pct. 0.20 0.19 0.18  0.20 0.18 0.17 
         Fert. 
2 
 
25th Pct. 0.24 0.23 0.22  0.17 0.16 0.16 
Median 0.27 0.25 0.24  0.23 0.22 0.21 
75th Pct. 0.30 0.28 0.27  0.33 0.31 0.29 
         Fert. 
3 
 
25th Pct. 0.18 0.17 0.16  0.12 0.11 0.11 
Median 0.20 0.18 0.18  0.16 0.15 0.14 
75th Pct. 0.22 0.21 0.20  0.22 0.21 0.19 
Note: Connectivity multiplied by 100. 
Table 6. Sensitivity of results to models without migration outside of marriage and without fertility preferences in years 50, 100 and 150 of 
the simulation. 
Kinship feature 
 
Statistic 
 
Year 50  Year 100  Year 150 
Base No Mig No Pref  Base No Mig No Pref  Base No Mig No Pref 
Population Alive 25th Pct. 253 201 254  635 399 632  400 191 394 
 Median 284 223 286  730 466 730  466 228 460 
 75th Pct. 318 248 316  844 537 832  543 266 532 
             
Close Kin 25th Pct. 4.19 4.75 4.19  4.29 4.57 4.26  1.53 1.77 1.51 
 Median 4.44 5.02 4.42  4.45 4.76 4.41  1.62 1.89 1.59 
 75th Pct. 4.69 5.28 4.65  4.61 4.95 4.54  1.70 2.00 1.67 
             
Indirect Kin 25th Pct. 4.48 6.05 4.50  9.77 11.06 9.66  2.70 3.34 2.58 
 Median 5.26 7.08 5.25  10.86 12.31 10.63  3.06 3.84 2.89 
 75th Pct. 6.12 8.22 6.20  11.87 13.67 11.70  3.36 4.30 3.20 
             
Connectivity 25th Pct. 1.37 1.99 1.35  1.13 1.65 1.11  0.16 0.23 0.16 
 Median 1.53 2.25 1.54  1.24 1.79 1.22  0.18 0.26 0.17 
 75th Pct. 1.73 2.53 1.74  1.35 1.97 1.33  0.20 0.29 0.19 
Note: Connectivity multiplied by 100. Base stands for the baseline fertility three, mortality three scenario combination beginning from a 
new village. Mig stands for model with no migration except for the purpose of exogamous marriage. Pref stands for model with no fertility 
preferences. 
5
5
 
Figure 2. Trends in close kin over time by fertility and mortality scenario and initial village. 
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Figure 3. Trends in indirect kin over time by fertility and mortality scenario and initial village. 
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Figure 4. Trends in connectivity over time by fertility and mortality scenario beginning from a new village. 
 
Note: Results multiplied by 100. 
5
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables and figures 
 
Table A1. Fertility Transitions in Select Countries. 
Region/ country 
Total fertility 
(If) 25% (If) 40% (If) 
Years 10% to 
40%  
English speaking "Europe Overseas"   
 Australia 1881 1891 1901 20 
 New Zealand 1881 1886 1891 10 
 United States <1880 1891 1901 >31 
Europe      
 France 1800 1836 1894 94 
 Iceland 1870 1920 1926 56 
 Belgium 1890 1910 1920 30 
 England and Wales 1891 1901 1921 30 
 Scotland 1891 1911 1931 40 
 Ireland 1891 1936 1985 94 
 Netherlands 1899 1920 1930 31 
 Germany 1900 1910 1933 33 
 Finland 1910 1920 1930 20 
 Spain 1930 1930 1940 10 
 Sweden 1910 1915 1925 15 
 Switzerland 1910 1910 1920 10 
 Denmark 1911 1921 1930 19 
 Italy 1911 1931 1951 40 
 Norway 1920 1920 1930 10 
 Greece 1928 1928 1951 23 
 Romania 1930 1930 1956 26 
 Yugoslavia 1931 1931 1960 29 
Spanish speaking "Europe Overseas"   
 Uruguay 1905 1910 1930 25 
 Argentina 1910 1910 1930 20 
 Chile 1965 1970 1975 10 
Early Industrial Asia     
 Japan 1930 1945 1945 15 
Ex-USSR Asia     
 Azerbaijan 1965 1975 1980 15 
 Turkmenistan 1975 1980 1990 15 
 Uzbekistan 1975 1980 1990 15 
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T able A1 continued. 
Caribbean      
 Martinique 1965 1970 1975 10 
 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1965 1970 1985 20 
 
Dominican 
Republic 1970 1975 1980 10 
 Guadeloupe 1970 1975 1975 5 
 Jamaica 1970 1975 1985 15 
Other Oceanic     
 Fiji 1960 1965 1970 10 
 New Caledonia 1960 1970 1975 15 
 Mauritius 1965 1970 1975 10 
 Reunion 1965 1975 1975 10 
 Guam 1965 1970 1975 10 
 French Polynesia 1970 1975 1980 10 
 Samoa 1970 1980 1985 15 
South America     
 Brazil 1965 1970 1975 10 
 Venezuela 1965 1970 1980 15 
 Columbia 1970 1970 1980 10 
 Ecuador 1970 1980 1985 15 
 Guyana 1970 1970 1975 5 
 Peru 1970 1980 1985 15 
 Surinam 1970 1975 1980 10 
Central America     
 Costa Rica 1965 1970 1975 10 
 El Salvador 1970 1980 1990 20 
 Panama 1970 1975 1980 10 
 Mexico 1975 1975 1985 10 
Mainstream Asia     
 Sri Lanka 1960 1970 1980 20 
 South Korea 1960 1965 1975 15 
 Singapore 1960 1965 1965 5 
 Brunei 1965 1975 1980 15 
 Hong Kong 1965 1970 1970 5 
 Malaysia 1965 1970 1975 10 
 Philippines 1965 1975 1985 20 
 Turkey 1960 1970 1980 20 
 China 1970 1975 1975 5 
 North Korea 1970 1975 1975 5 
 Cambodia 1970 1975 1985 15 
 Indonesia 1970 1970 1985 15 
 Thailand 1970 1975 1980 10 
 Mongolia 1980 1990 1990 10 
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T able A1 continued. 
North Africa     
 Egypt 1970 1975 1990 20 
 Tunisia 1970 1980 1985 15 
 Morocco 1975 1980 1990 15 
 Algeria 1980 1985 1990 10 
 Bahrain 1970 1975 1985 15 
 Lebanon 1970 1975 1990 20 
 Kuwait 1975 1980 1985 10 
Sub-Saharan Africa     
 South Africa 1970 1980 1990 20 
Note: Reproduced from Caldwell and Caldwell (2006), the regional groupings are argued in 
that text. 
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Appendix B: Technical Methods of Simulating Demography and Kinship 
 
The agent based microsimulation model used in this paper tracks demographic 
events and kinship structures in villages that attempt to mimic those of Nang Rong, 
Thailand. As discussed in the text, this model shares the key features of all agent based 
models: it starts with a heterogenous pool of individuals who may interact with each 
other and by doing so influence the actions of others. The model employed in this paper 
achieves this by starting with a group of individuals of varying ages, genders, kinship 
connectivity, and propensities towards higher or lower fertility. These individuals then 
interact by marrying each other (or those outside of the village) and giving birth to further 
residents, who may, in turn, marry others in the village. At all points, these individuals 
are subject to the risk of dying or permanently out-migrating from the village, and new 
individuals may enter the population by in-migrating. The parent-to-child transmission of 
fertility preferences constitutes a key feature by which agents in the model influence the 
behavior of other agents, in this case that of their children.  
In this technical appendix I describe the operation of the model. I begin by 
introducing the order of demographic operations, the sequence of demographic events 
which individuals experience each year and over the course of their lives. After this I 
justify and define the means by which individual shifts in fertility preferences are 
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transmitted. Finally, I describe the specific calculation of the demographic parameters 
which inform the model in this order: fertility, mortality, marriage, and migration. 
 
Order of Demographic Operations 
All agent based models begin with a heterogenous set of autonomous actors 
(Macy and Willer 2002). In this paper, this set is conceived as an initial village, 
analogous to the villages of Nang Rong district, Thailand, where the model is set. As 
described in the text, two types of initial villages were considered – a new village and an 
established village. The simulation begins from either of these two populations in year 0, 
corresponding to the calendar year 1900. 
In the first year of the simulation, eligible residents are subjected to the following 
sequence of demographic events. First, individuals are subjected to the risk of migrating 
out of the village, and, if they leave, they do so immediately. Second, individuals decide 
whether to not attempt to marry that year, to marry someone from outside of the village 
and immediately settle with their spouse in a different village, to marry someone from 
outside of the village and settle with their new spouse in the village, or to attempt to 
marry an eligible partner within the village. Third, if they are a woman who was married 
in the previous year, they are subjected to the risk of giving birth to a child. Fourth, 
everyone is subjected to the risk of dying. Finally, at the conclusion of these operations, 
in-migrants, who may or may not be linked by kinship, move into the village. 
After the model begins in 1900, there are three ways to enter the village. Someone 
may enter the village by marrying a village resident and deciding to reside in their 
spouse’s village, they may be born to a village resident, or they may in-migrate. There are 
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three ways to exit the village. A village resident may out-migrate, they may marry 
someone from a different village and decide to settle in their spouse’s home, or they may 
die. In the pages that follow I detail these manners of entrance and exit from the 
population, but first I concentrate on one of the interactions that occurs within the village, 
specifically the transmission of fertility preferences from parents to children and from 
village residents to their exogamous spouses who settle in the village. 
 
Fertility Preferences 
A second key feature of agent based models is the heterogeneity of agents and the 
ability for agent traits to be passed, imitated, or inherited locally through the interactions 
that agents experience with each other (Macy and Willer 2002). The model employed 
allows for a similar possibility through a focus on the heritability of numbers of children. 
Without accounting for intra-individual and intergenerational stability in fertility 
decisions, estimates of family structure have been shown to be biased in the literature 
(Ruggles 1993), and it can be expected that broader networks of kin relations will have a 
similar experience. 
In general, because it is broadly acknowledged that mothers and daughters have 
correlated fertility levels (Pearson and Lee 1899; Huestis and Maxwell 1932; Berent 
1953; Kantner and Potter 1954; Duncan et al. 1965; Hendershot 1969; Johnson and 
Stokes 1976; Anderton et al. 1987; Pullum and Wolf 1991), and because there may be 
reasons – ranging from stable individual preferences to biological capacities in terms of 
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fecundity
11
 – for which individuals are consistently subjected to higher (or lower) risks of 
childbirth, I endow the initial agents, both male and female, each with a log odds shift 
that, for women, will constitute their deviation from the global probability in the 
likelihood that they give birth in a given year of exposure (note that a similar process was 
described in Wachter, Blackwell and Hammel 1997). Individual agents’ heterogeneity in 
terms of fertility preferences is also treated as heritable
12
. For this reason, both male and 
female agents are assigned preferences, though only those of the woman matter for her 
likelihood of childbirth. Initial agents and those who migrate into the village receive a 
random shift from 0. Children born and spouses who marry into the village receive the 
average of their parents’ or spouses preferences, respectively, plus random error.  
Random shifts are constructed from each individual’s predetermined fertility 
probability – either zero or the average of one’s parents’ or spouse’s probabilities – by 
equation B1: 
(B1).  , 
where  is the shifted likelihood of person i, s is the random shift (0.1 in all scenarios), 
and  is individual i's predetermined fertility probability. Notably, individuals only 
receive a shift when they enter the village. 
 
Fertility Parameters 
                                                 
11 Henceforth, I refer to this as fertility preferences, but the term is used for simplicity 
and is intended to capture the broad suite of reasons that individuals may experience 
consistently higher or lower fertility. 
12 I use the term heritable to convey the idea that such traits may be passed from 
generation to generation, ignoring whether the mechanism of their transmission is 
genetic, socio-cultural or both. 
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 The dominant means by which individuals may enter the population is by being 
born to a village resident. This section describes how resident women are subjected to the 
risk of giving birth. Female village residents who were married and whose spouse was 
resident in the village in the previous year are subjected to the risk of giving birth 
determined by the combination of their age and the year of the model.  
To derive the age-specific fertility probabilities, I used the Coale and Trussel 
(1974; 1978) model marital fertility schedules. These schedules operate through two key 
parameters (M and m) which define, respectively, the population’s inherent deviation 
from natural fertility and its extent of contraceptive use.  
From years 1-100, the annual M and m parameters are specific to each scenario. 
In fertility scenario 1, M is 0.85 from years 1 to 50. It then suffers a linear decline from 
years 51 to 60 to a level of 0.70, this corresponds to an initial drop in fertility, which is 
typically used to diagnose the onset of a fertility transition. From years 61 to 85 it linearly 
declines from 0.70 to 0.35; this captures some of the broader decline in fertility discussed 
in the text. Finally, from years 86-100, M linearly decline from 0.35 to 0.25. In fertility 
scenario one m, the parameter reflecting contraceptive use, is 0 until year 60. From years 
61 to 100 m linearly increases from 0 to 0.575.  
In fertility scenario 2, M is 0.85 until year 60, wherein from years 61 to 80 it 
declines linearly to 0.70. After this, from years 81-95, M linearly declines from 0.70 to 
0.35. In years 96-100 it linearly declines from 0.35 to 0.25. In this scenario, m does the 
same thing it does in fertility scenario 1, remaining constant at 0 until year 60 then 
linearly rising to 0.575 by year 100.  
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In fertility scenario 3, M remains constant at 0.85 until year 60. After this it 
declines to 0.70 over the decade between years 61 and 70. From there it declines rapidly 
to 0.35 in the years 71 to 80. Finally, its decline slows between the years 81 and 100 
when it reaches 0.25. In fertility scenario 3, unlike the others, the contraceptive 
revolution occurs later and more rapidly; m remains constant at 0 until year 70, and from 
years 71 to 100 it rises to 0.575.  
Notably, all three fertility scenarios are governed by the same parameters until 
year 50 and have the same ending parameters in year 100. The difference between them 
occurs in their trajectory between these points, their fertility transitions. From years 101-
150, the fertility parameters were chosen to reflect the age-specific fertility put forth in 
the median variant of the United Nations’ prospects for Thailand (United Nations 2008a). 
They were not defined according to the model marital fertility schedules of Coale and 
Trussel, but were instead put directly into the model. The UN data come in five year age 
brackets for five year periods. This data was translated into single age and single year 
intervals by two sets of linear interpolations. Notably, all fertility scenarios experience 
the same exact fertility parameters from years 101 to 150. 
 
Mortality Parameters 
In the agent-based model employed in this paper, death is the chief means of 
exiting the population. In each year, each individual is subjected to the period specific 
risk of dying specific to their age and sex. These parameters were defined using the nQx 
column of the United Nations’ model life tables (United Nations 1995; see also Coale, 
Demeny and Vaughan 1983; Coale and Guo 1989). These model mortality schedules are 
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indexed by the life-expectancy at birth in the population. In keeping with the 
recommendations of Siegel, Swanson and Shryock (2004), I use the “Latin American” 
model as this approximates Thai mortality schedules
13
. The specific life expectancy 
parameters used in each scenario can be seen in figure 2. 
As with fertility, the age-sex-period specific risks of dying are unique to each 
scenario between the years 1 and 100. As these are graphed in figure 1 in the main text, I 
do not discuss them here. However, unlike the fertility scenarios where the United 
Nations’ median variant projections yielded age-specific fertility rates, the most 
consistently available mortality data concerns life expectancy at birth. I used this data 
(United Nations 2008b), as inputs to the model mortality schedules discussed above to 
define the age-period specific mortality rates. Note that the five year brackets of the 
United Nations’ data was handled by linear interpolation and rounding. As with fertility, 
the mortality data between years 101 and 150 are the same for all scenarios. 
 
Marriage Parameters 
Complexity is a common theme in demographic models of marriage (cf. Todd, 
Billari and Simao 2005). Wachter, Blackwell and Hammel (1997) distinguish 
demographic simulations as either considering a closed model, where all marriage occurs 
within the modeled population, or an open model, where all marriage occurs to outsiders 
who move into the simulation. Clearly, this choice will have important implications for 
                                                 
13 Notably, the United Nations' model life tables leave age 85 as an open category for 
probabilities of dying, which means that all individuals above age 85 are subjected to a 
100% probability of dying while they are in that age group. Lacking specific annual 
probabilities of dying above that age, I substitute the probability of death extrapolated 
from the category average in prior years; after repeated exposure to this, very few 
individuals live to be 100 years old. 
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the shape of the kinship network, and neither approach is an ideal representation of 
demographic realities.  
Here, the parameters regarding marriage attempt to reflect the marriage market of 
a small community. To do so, I consider a mixed model wherein some individuals marry 
others from within the village and other individuals marry people from outside of the 
vilalge. Marriage parameters are motivated by Coale and McNeil’s (1972) work on 
model marriage schedules. Coale and McNeil argue that a schedule which records first 
marital frequencies takes the same basic shape in all populations. Their model 
demonstrates that a convolution of a normal distribution of age of entry into 
marriageability and three other delays (time to meeting a potential spouse, time from 
meeting to engagement, and time from engagement to marriage), each of exponentially 
less importance, describes the first marriage patterns of many populations.  
Though this schedule works to describe population averages, it is challenging to 
imagine how it would be applied to an individualized model (cf. Todd et al. 2005 for one 
attempt which yielded results largely in keeping with Coale and McNeil’s model; see 
White 1999 for an entirely different model). Thus, the solution used in this paper retains 
the spirit of that work, but has slight differences. As with Coale and McNeil’s model, 
individuals cannot marry until they have reached an “age of entry into marriageability”.  
This threshold, similar to the first and most important delay in the Coale and McNeil 
model, is assumed to be normally distributed with a right skew. It was constructed using 
a cumulative distribution of ages from 15-25. In other words, no one is eligible to 
consider marriage until age 15, but everyone is considering it by age 25. Note that 
women lose their eligibility to marry after age 50 and men do so after age 70. 
 70 
Once an individual has reached the point at which he or she begins to consider 
marriage, that individual then chooses between one of four options: not getting married 
that year, marrying someone from outside of the village and settling in a different village, 
marrying someone from outside of the village and settling within the village, or 
attempting to marry someone within the village. If they choose the second option – 
exogamous marriage with post-nuptial residence outside of the village – then they leave 
the village in that year. If they choose the third option – exogamous marriage with post-
nuptial residence in the village – then their spouse moves into the village. By default, 
male spouses who move into the village are two years older than their wives and female 
spouses who move into the village are two years older than their husbands. As discussed 
above, spouses who move into the village receive the fertility preferences of their partner 
plus random noise. 
It is the fourth option that is most complex, but which is also a crucial form of 
interaction within the village and a key reason that this agent based model of 
demographic interaction differs from prior micro-simulation models elaborated in the 
main text. Each year, males and females who have opted to attempt to marry someone 
from within the village – that is, to marry endogamously – are arrayed into two lists, 
which are randomly permuted to avoid ordering effects. Females proceed sequentially, in 
the randomly permuted order, to consider each male in the randomly permuted male list. 
If it is possible for them to marry that individual – that is, if they are not close kin – they 
consider marrying that person. Each eligible within village pair is subjected to a 10% risk 
of marrying. If they do not marry, then the woman proceeds to the next eligible man on 
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the list and considers marrying him, and so on until she is married, at which point the 
next woman begins to consider men.  
Whenever a particular pair marries, both are removed from the pool of eligible 
individuals. Thus, it is quite possible that a woman at the bottom of the list in a given 
year will not have any eligible men that she might marry, or that men may remain on the 
list after all women have married others. This is akin to the second, exponentially less 
important, delay of the Coale and McNeil model of marriage. Though, roughly in keeping 
with the experience of rural Thailand, the model makes no allowances for divorce, 
individuals who were previously married may reenter the pool of individuals who are 
eligible to marry if their spouse dies and they are below the threshold ages. In this case, 
they are treated in the same way as anyone else in that pool. 
The marriage parameters for the model were defined in keeping with the 
experience of Thailand and after testing to ensure that the likelihood of an eligible 
endogamous pair becoming married was large enough to maintain the population over 
time
14
. Through observation of data regarding marriage in Thailand, it was determined 
the age pattern of marriage and the proportions married varied little over time. As a 
result, the parameters regarding age of entry into marriageability, the proportions of those 
eligible to consider various types of marriage, and the likelihood of endogamous success 
were held constant over time. The proportions considering each type of marriage were 
held constant: 50% decide not to get married each year, 10% decide to marry 
exogamously and leave the village, 10% decide to marry exogamously and remain in the 
                                                 
14 An effort was made to keep it small as it does not need to be large. If there are 10 
eligible men, a woman is near certain to marry one of them with a 10% success rate. 
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village, and the remaining 30% decide to attempt to marry someone from within the 
village. Men and women share the same parameters for all of these things. 
 
Migration Parameters 
Nang Rong, as a frontier area, moved from being a net receiver of migrants in the 
early 20
th
 century to a net exporter by the latter part of the century. Thus, each scenario, 
in keeping with the experience of Nang Rong, moves from a state of low out-migration 
and high in-migration to a state of high out-migration and low in-migration. However, 
translating this basic historical pattern into manipulatable and interpretable parameters is 
a challenge. The most readily available means of doing so is through the use of crude 
rates of migration, but, as with all crude rates, these are problematic for describing the 
amount of migration that can be expected because they ignore the age structure of the 
population at risk of migrating. Thus, in order to use these crude rates in this model, I 
translate them into expected age-specific rates of migration using the age-distribution of 
migration in Nang Rong between 1994 and 2000. In this section I describe these 
translations, first for in-migration and then for out-migration. 
The in-migration component of the model is controlled by two parameters, a) the 
proportion of the population within the village which enters (akin to the crude-rate of in-
migration, the most readily available means of characterizing in-migration given that the 
population at risk of moving into the village is unknown) and b) the extent to which those 
migrating into the village are kin. 
This is done in two steps. First, I use the age distribution of migration, given by 
equation B2: 
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(B2)  , 
where  is the number of migrants of a given age and sex, is the number of 
individuals of a given age and sex in the population, and  is the age-sex specific rate 
of migration. This equation is then broken down so it can be used in the simulation. I 
achieve this by noting that the number of migrants of at a given age and sex is determined 
by equation B3: 
(B3)  , 
where P is the total population, M is the proportion of the population that are migrants 
(the parameter which I later manipulate), and Na is the proportion of the migrants that are 
of a given age and sex. Substituting (2) into (1) yields a situation that, with the 
assumption that Na is the same in the simulated population and Nang Rong
15
, allows for 
the calculation of an age-sex specific rate of in-migration in the simulation using a 
controllable parameter (M) and the information from the population being simulated. In 
equation form this looks like B4: 
(B4)  , 
where P
 
denotes the size of the population of interest in a given year of the simulation, Na 
is the relevant proportion of migrants of a given age and sex in the observed population 
(Nang Rong), Pa is the proportion of the simulated population that is a given age and sex 
                                                 
15 That is, assuming that the age-distribution of migrants are the same in both 
populations, which is reasonable as the migrants who have come to Nang Rong over the 
past century are likely similar in their age and sex distribution to those who left Nang 
Rong for somewhere outside of Buriram province between 1994 and 2000. Those are the 
individuals whose age and sex distribution are used to determine the ages and sexes of 
the immigrants. 
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in that year of the simulation, and M is the parameter governing the sex-specific 
proportion of the population that will be set to move in during that year of the simulation. 
 The in-migration component of the model is also influenced by a parameter (K) 
which governs the extent to which those who migrate into the village are kin-linked to 
one another. Specifically, once the age-sex specific number of migrants who move into 
the simulated village in a given year has been defined, all opposite sex-pairs of in-
migrants over the age of 15 are subject to the risk of marriage defined by K. The model 
then attempts to assign all children below the age of 12 to one set of parents, if this 
cannot be done they are assigned to a random mother or father, in the unlikely event that 
neither of these can be done it is assumed that the children are hosted by distant kin or 
friends of the family
16
. The parameter K is set to 50% for all years. 
Like the in-migration component, the out-migration component of the model is 
governed by a parameter which controls the proportion of the at-risk population 
(unmarried individuals who were born in the village
17
) who leave. However, the two 
components use this parameter very differently. For the out-migration component, the 
proportion leaving is multiplied by the population of the village and rounded to select an 
approximate number of individuals who will leave. So to introduce an element of 
stochasticity into the out-migration component, this approximate number is then 
translated into the actual numbers who leave by drawing from a Poisson distribution with 
                                                 
16 Note that these chidlrens’ kin links to their distant kin are not included in the model. 
However, given that the age distribution of migrants typically includes very few children, 
it is extremely unlikely that children will not to be assigned to parents. 
17 In Nang Rong, few married individuals leave the village for the purposes of migration. 
Though migration for the purposes of marriage is substantial (Čhampāklāi [Jampaklay] 
2005, 2006), this type of migration is defined in the marriage model described above. The 
model keeps no track of individuals who temporarily migrate into the village only to later 
leave.  
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a mean given by the approximate number. From here, out-migrants are selected randomly 
from the population of unmarried and childless individuals; thus, the age-sex distribution 
of out-migrants will be proportional to the age-sex distribution of unmarried and childless 
individuals in the simulated village in that year. There is no parameter in the out-
migration model describing the connectivity of those who leave, but, because they must 
be unmarried individuals, they will have neither spouses nor children. 
Finally, in keeping with Kingsley Davis's demographic theory of multi-phasic 
response (cf. Davis 1963; Friedlander 1969), I ensure that the population of the simulated 
village neither crashes to zero nor expands to an overly large level by imposing swells of 
migration when the village population grows too small or too large. Thus, when the 
population declines to fewer than 5 individuals, a random number of people drawn from a 
Poisson distribution with a mean of 15 moves in. In contrast, if the population grows to 
more than 1,500 individuals, I define the number of emigrants as 250. Though these 
restrictions keep the model running in cases where the population becomes unsustainable, 
an examination of the model outputs shows that they were very rarely exercised, and only 
in years prior to 1900 during the growth of the initial village. 
 Thus far I have described how the migration model is defined by analogs of the 
crude rates of in- and out-migration, I now turn to a description of the trajectories of these 
rates used over the course of the model, which are the same in all scenarios. As discussed 
above, the villages of Nang Rong proceeded from a state of high in-migration and low 
out-migration to a state of high out-migration and low in-migration. In the model, this 
switch occurs in the following fashion. For out-migration, a very small 0.01% of the 
population leaves each year from 1900 to 1970. Between 1970 and 1980 this transitions 
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to 3%, and remains there from 1980 until 2000. From 2000 to the conclusion of the 
model, out-migration declines to 0.25%. For in-migration, the trends are roughly reversed 
but reflect the different time scale of when in-migration tapered off in the region. In each 
of the years between 1 and 45 in-migrants whose total is equivalent to 0.50% of the 
population enter the village. Between 1945 and 1955, the proportion entering the village 
transitions to 0.25% and remains at that level until the end of the simulation. 
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